

[H.A.S.C. No. 111-59]

HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
—
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
—

HEARING HELD
MAY 14, 2009



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FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, May 14, 2009.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:34 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon. The House Armed Services Committee meets now to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2010 Army budget request. Our witnesses today, the Honorable Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army, and a former Member over here; and General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the United States Army. And we welcome you and thank you for coming to our hearing.

Afghanistan and Iraq have driven big changes for the Army. New doctrine manuals on counterinsurgency, stability operations, and security forces assistance have all been issued in the past few years, and they all point to the increasing emphasis on balancing the effort of the Army between traditional and conventional war and stability operations and irregular warfare. And this, too, may drive force structure changes as the Army looks to build the Advise and Assist Brigades that the President mentioned as part of changing our mission in Iraq.

What these will look like, whether we institutionalize these brigades, and if and how they will be used in the future are all significant questions.

Budgets, as we often say, are the actual demonstration of our strategy in the way ahead. I think the Army budget that has been submitted certainly points to big changes. The cancellation of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) vehicle, the decision to build only 45 instead of 48 Active Duty combat brigades, and the hand-off of the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program to the Air Force are just a few of the very significant changes in our budget. I am sure our committee will have many, many questions about these program changes.

At the same time we ask about the future, we shouldn't lose sight of the present in doing so. Army readiness levels are still unacceptably low. I hope we will hear today about how we will fix that readiness problem, particularly since the budget appears to flat-line operations and maintenance (O&M) funding.

Army recruitment and retention, on the other hand, seem to have recovered significantly from the levels of a few years ago, although it remains to be seen what happens when the economy begins to recover. In the past we moved too aggressively to cut funding for recruitment and retention, and I hope that we will hear more about this today.

Back home this budget appears to continue the commitment to take care of our troops and their families by funding a 2.9 percent pay raise and increasing funding to care for the wounded and the injured. Best of all, this budget moves these funds to the base budget, institutionalizing them for the future.

Family support programs, such as child care and spousal support, also fare well. I have long said that our people and their families are our first priority. I am glad that this budget appears to adopt that point of view.

In short, the budget signals many changes for the future. Some, like the continuing commitment to our personnel, are welcome. Other decisions, however, will no doubt generate many questions. Decisions made today will develop the Army of the future and should not be entered into lightly. We have heard the general talk about this at length. We need to understand the future environment that is envisioned and the way these programs will address them. I hope our witnesses here today will help us.

I now turn to my friend, the Ranking Member, the gentleman from New York, John McHugh.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see you again, Mr. Chairman. We have all spent a lot—

The CHAIRMAN. It has been a while since we have seen each other.

Mr. MCHUGH. Yeah. A little time together in the last 36 hours or so. I was quipping earlier, about this time, I want to know if I need a shave, I look at Ike Skelton's face.

But we are honored, of course, to have our distinguished panelists, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, and we have had on the plus side some opportunity to say thank you to some remarkable leaders. And today this afternoon's panel is certainly no exception. General Casey and Secretary Geren have been incredible leaders in an Army whose success story has been, first of all, a tribute to that leadership, but second of all, a real testament to the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States Army. And it is remarkable. In the midst of a war in two very different theaters, the Army has completely transformed its structure of the forces, adapted to the enemy and environment, and moved ahead with its modernization. And those are hard things to do under the best of circumstances, and obviously, these have not been the best. They have been very challenging circumstances.

And gentlemen, thank you, and please convey all of our deepest appreciation to those brave men and women who wear the Army

uniform for all that they have done and continue to do in remarkable ways each and every day.

Two years ago, gentlemen, both of you testified before this committee regarding the Army's strategic initiatives. You, I felt, made it very clear that the Army was out of balance. It was not a secret, not a surprise. You made it clear as well that as you continued to shepherd our way through those challenges, that it would probably take three to four years to reacquire that balance, and in the process having the Army seek to achieve four objectives: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform.

And the question, as the Chairman, I think, rightly outlined is does this budget request fail or succeed in the many choices that it had to make to support those efforts? And just let me pick off a few areas that I think we need to explore and obtain your opinions on.

The fiscal year 2010 Army top-line request is advertised as being rather significant, 2.1 percent increase over 2009. But that could be somewhat misleading, that when you add together the funding that was received in the past through supplementals, and the drop-off as we migrate those supplementals into the base, it looks more like the fiscal year 2010 Army budget will be funded at something around \$4 billion less than fiscal year 2009.

Secondly, those costs associated with end-strength, increases, and reset, which are so important, our men and women in uniform, the heart and soul, our efforts to grow this force that many on this committee, in fact the vast majority on this committee, have worked hard to achieve, has been funded through supplemental appropriations, approximately \$20 billion a year.

I support doing away with the supplementals. I think the President and Secretary Gates have taken an important step forward. But as, again, we consider that migration into the base, the Army's budget and supplemental, now called the OCO, the Overseas Contingency Operation Account, doesn't appear to have increased accordingly. In fact, the fiscal year 2010 OCO funds reset at \$11 billion. We have more forces going to Afghanistan, more equipment returning from Iraq, and that reset reduced by several billions of dollars.

In that same vein, procurement accounts for the Army, not including JIEDDO, or the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization, in the past were funded at some \$61 billion in 2008, \$37 billion in 2009, yet the request for fiscal year 2010 totals about \$30 billion.

I remember very clearly, Mr. Chairman, and you may recall as well, that then-Chief of Staff General Schoomaker coming to this very room and telling us the Army entered the post-9/11 world with a \$56 billion procurement shortfall. He called it holes in the ark. And the question, therefore, is pretty simple: Does this budget signal the start of yet another procurement holiday, or does it represent an equitable balance of hard choices?

Just a couple of other areas of concern. The research and development (R&D) accounts were funded at \$12 billion in 2008 and 2009, yet the 2010 request has been decreased to \$10 billion. And while the President and the Secretary of Defense have said they support the Army's plan to grow the force, something I credit the

President with, is putting into one of his highlights of his proposal a 2.1 percent increase when adjusted for inflation, causes me some concern that the Army might have to pay for much of this increase out of hide.

And lastly, before the QDR, the Quadrennial Defense Review, has really even begun, a decision has been made, as the Chairman referenced, to cut projected Army force structure by three brigade combat teams (BCTs). Was this is a cut, again, as a matter of hard choices, on balance, or was it what I fear—I will rephrase, I hope—it is not, and that is a lack of commitment to growing the force? And, Chief, you and I talked about this, and I think it is important for you to have your views placed on the record. I think they are enlightening.

So, in conclusion, gentlemen, we look forward to your comments. All of us stand together as one team. That is the pride of our Nation's military forces, and it is also, frankly, the pride of this committee that we work in ways that, for all the differences we might bring to the table, we understand our unified commitment has to be to those men and women in uniform that serve us so bravely. So again, gentlemen, thank you for all you do. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

During our hearing yesterday with the Secretary and Admiral Mullen, as well as this morning when we had the Navy and Marine Corps here, we were interrupted by votes on the floor, and I anticipate that might happen again. So we ask you to bear with us. We shall return and continue our hearing.

Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETE GEREN, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Secretary GEREN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman and Congressman McHugh. It is truly an honor for General Casey and me to appear before you and discuss our United States Army, an Army that has been built on a partnership between this great institution and the soldiers of our Army, a partnership that goes back to the First Continental Congress and continues to this day.

We provided the committee a full posture statement. I ask that that be introduced into the record.

The Army family suffered a horrible tragedy in Baghdad, Monday, two days ago, and I know all of our prayers and condolences go out to the loved ones of those who lost their lives in that incident. Sergeant John Russell has been charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with five counts of murder. I know many of you have questions concerning that tragic incident. However, because of the role of service secretaries in the military criminal justice system and concerns about command influence, we won't be able to discuss that in this hearing today. I just wanted to address that at the outset.

Mr. Chairman, the President's budget for 2010 is before the Congress, and it recommends \$142 billion for our Army. The Army budget is mostly about people and the operations and maintenance (O&M) to support our people. Our personnel and O&M accounts make up a full two-thirds of our budget, reflecting General Abram's axiom that people are not in the Army, people are the Army. Our

Army, soldiers, families, and civilians are stretched by this long war, but our Army remains the best-led, best-trained, best-equipped force we have ever put in the field, and this committee's ongoing support has much to do with that, and we thank you for that.

Mr. Chairman, the noncommissioned officer is the backbone of this great Army, and we have designated 2009 as the Year of the Noncommissioned Officer (NCO). At the front of every Army mission, here or overseas, you will find a noncommissioned officer. This year we give our noncommissioned officers special recognition and commit to enhancing their professional development to be able to meet the demands that we place on them.

I would like to recognize former noncommissioned officers who serve on your committee: Congressman Coffman, Congressman Conaway, Congressman Marshall, and Congressman Reyes.

This year we are honoring all noncommissioned officers, past and present, and next week we are going to honor all former NCOs who are Members of Congress with a parade on Fort Myers Whipple Field on May 19, and we hope all Members can join us to recognize these great soldiers who now are serving our country as Members of the United States Congress.

Currently we have over 710,000 soldiers on Active Duty, with 243,000 deployed in 80 countries around the world. Additionally, we have over a quarter of a million Army civilians providing support. Our National Guard and Reserves continue to shoulder a heavy burden for our Nation. Since 9/11 we have activated over 400,000 guardsmen and reservists in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and we are all thankful that our Reserve component carries such a heavy load in responding to domestic emergencies.

We truly are one Army. Our National Guard and Reserves are transitioning from a strategic reserve to an operational force, and I would like to discuss some of the progress we have made. In 2001, we spent about \$1 billion on National Guard equipment. This year we are spending \$4 billion, and we have for the last couple of years. The 2010 budget calls for \$4 billion. As a result, we anticipate that the last Huey helicopter, the venerable workhorse dating from the Vietnam era, will leave Guard service by the end of this year. At that time the Guard will have 40 brand new light utility helicopters and nearly 800 new Black Hawks, with more on the way. Additionally, over 8,000 new trucks have been provided to the Guard and the famous Deuce and a Half soon will go the same way as the Huey.

This 2009 hurricane season is the first since 2004 in which the Guard is not going to have to borrow equipment from the Active or the Reserve components to meet their planning needs for the hurricane season.

And we have also made good progress in implementing the recommendations to the Commission on National Guard and Reserves with 14 of the 19 Army-led implementation plans completed.

Mr. Chairman, as you well know, soldiers are our most valuable asset. The strength of our soldiers depends on the strength of Army families, and the support of those families is a top priority in this budget. From fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2009, with your sup-

port we have more than doubled funding for Army family programs. In this fiscal year 2010 budget, it includes \$1.7 billion in the base budget for family programs.

We have made many changes in how we support families. We have provided full-time personnel to family readiness groups to provide support to our volunteer spouses who carry such a heavy load in this time of multiple deployments. We are providing expanded child care for families of deployed soldiers, including 16 hours per child per month of free child care for every deployed soldier's child.

The budget maintains Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) and continues to push ahead with Residential Communities Initiative (RCI), a program that you championed. They are at a level that will ensure that we provide our soldiers and families with the quality of life they deserve. The budget continues improvement in the care of support for wounded, ill and injured soldiers, and we have initiated programs to better diagnose and treat the invisible wounds of war, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and traumatic brain injury, and with congressional leadership we are investing unprecedented amounts in brain injury research.

The fiscal year 2010 budget also will let us work towards a seamless transition from the Department of Defense to the Veterans Affairs for those wounded or injured soldiers who return to private life. After seven-plus years of war with an All-Volunteer Force, we are in uncharted waters, and our soldiers and families are carrying a heavy burden for our Nation.

We are working to reverse the tragic rise in soldier suicides. It is a top priority throughout our Army, and our Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Corelli is leading that effort. We partnered with the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) on a 5-year, \$50 million study to incorporate their world-renowned expertise in mental health research into the Army's suicide prevention efforts. We are educating all soldiers in new and innovative ways of suicide risk identification and reduction. Every NCO now knows how to recognize the symptoms of a heat stroke and knows what to do about it. Our goal is for every soldier in the Army to be able to identify the symptoms of a potential suicide and know what to do about it.

We have also launched new initiatives to attack the problem of sexual assault and harassment, and as we work to prevent sexual harassment and sexual assault, we are also working to become the Nation's best in the investigation and prosecution of sexual assault. We have used the highly qualified expert authority that you gave us a couple of years ago to hire national experts to work with our investigators and our prosecutors. We want to be the Nation's model for the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of sexual assault.

To meet the mental health care needs of a growing force, the U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) has increased their mental health providers by about 40 percent, and we have more than 200 behavioral health care providers deployed to theater. But even with these increases, we do not have all the mental health support that we need, and we will continue to work with this committee to address that issue. Whether the problem is PTSD, suicidal idea-

tion, the trauma of sexual assault, or dealing with any mental or emotional health issue, we are working hard to remove the stigma that stops some soldiers from seeking help for their mental health needs.

We are improving how we do business, instituting major reforms in our contract acquisition processes, while continuing to provide the equipment our soldiers need to the more than 250,000 soldiers scattered around the world. We thank you for last year you authorized five new general officers for our Contracting Command. That is going to make great strides for us in building the bench that was depleted over the last 15 years. And we are adding nearly 700 military and over 1,000 civilians for our contracting workforce.

Being a good steward is more than just taking care of our money. Our goal is to lead the Department and the entire Federal Government in protecting the environment. Our Army's Energy Security Strategy reduces energy consumption and carbon dioxide emission by using innovative technologies. At Fort Carson we built a two-megawatt solar project. We have solar projects at 20 other locations, and currently we produce nearly 19,000 megawatts of non-fossil-fuel energy on our installations around the country. We are planning for a 500-megawatt solar farm at Fort Irwin, bigger than any solar project in America today. At Fort Myer you can see some of the 4,000 electric cars we are in the process of acquiring. Those 4,000 cars will cut fuel consumption by 11.5 million gallons and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by over 100,000 tons per year, and we are investing over 54 billion in green building.

I am pleased to report that we are on track to finish Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) by 2011.

Mr. Chairman, in summary, we are a busy, stretched, and stressed Army, with soldiers, civilians, and Army families doing the extraordinary as the ordinary every single day. Our Nation's finest young men and women are ready to respond to whatever our national leaders demand around the world and here at home. In 2008, nearly 300,000 men and women enlisted or reenlisted in our Army, joined our Army or reenlisted in an Army at war. They are volunteer soldiers with volunteer families. They are proud of what they do, and we are proud of who they are.

For the past 7½ years, I have watched soldiers go off to war, and I have watched their families stand with them, and watched our Congress stand alongside of them every step of the way. Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, thank you for your support of our soldiers and their families and for the resources and support you provide us every year.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Geren and General Casey can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

The CHAIRMAN. Now for the uniformed leader of our Army, General Casey.

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I start, though, I would like to pick up on the Secretary's theme about the Year of the Noncommissioned Officer. And I would like to present

to you some great noncommissioned officers and the spouse of a fallen noncommissioned officer.

First I would like to introduce Sergeant Joel Dulashanti. He is a sniper from the 82nd Airborne Division from Cincinnati, Ohio. He was wounded in Afghanistan, fairly severely, has lost his right leg. And he is the holder of a Purple Heart and an Army Commendation Medal with V for valor. He is here recovering and expects to be back in a couple of months to his unit.

Second, Staff Sergeant Brian Tidwell. Sergeant Tidwell has two tours in Iraq, both with Stryker units, and he, like the other three NCOs you will meet now, are all helping us in our program executive office for soldiers. They are giving us direct combat experience into preparing equipment for our soldiers.

Master Sergeant Jonathan Holmes. One tour in Iraq. He is an Air Defense Artillery noncommissioned officer, and, again, he is helping us there develop systems for our soldiers.

And Master Sergeant Marc Griffith, six tours in Iraq and Afghanistan with the Rangers and with the Strykers, and great experience being applied to our soldiers. Thank you.

And I have got one more person I would like to introduce, and that is Dana Lamberson. And Dana is the spouse of Sergeant First Class Rand Lamberson, whose bracelet I wear, who was killed a little over three years ago in Ramadi, Iraq. And she sits on our panel, my panel, to help us better understand the needs of surviving spouses, and she has made great contributions.

So, Dana, thank you very much for coming.

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you for bringing these great Americans with you, and the very best to you. And thank you for your service and your sacrifice.

General.

General CASEY. Thank you, Chairman and members of the committee. I would like to give you just an update of where we are and where we have progressed over the last year here. You will recall, and Congressman McHugh mentioned this in his opening statement, that last year I came before you and said that the Army was out of balance, that we were so weighed down by our current demands that we couldn't do the things we know we need to do to sustain this All-Volunteer Force for the long haul and to prepare to do other things. I can tell you we have made progress to put ourselves back in balance, but we are not, by any stretch of the imagination, out of the woods yet.

I also told you that we had a plan in place, centered on four imperatives to achieve balance by 2011: That we had to sustain our soldiers and families; that we had to continue to prepare soldiers for success in the current conflict; that we had to reset them effectively to go back; and that we had to continue to transform for an uncertain future.

I would like to give you just a progress report on our six major objectives to get ourselves back in balance. Our first objective was to complete the growth that was directed by the last Administration in February of 2007. I can report to you that, as of this month, all components, Active, Guard, and Reserve, have met the directed end-strength targets that were originally not going to be achieved until 2012. Now, we still have some work to do to put those people

into units, match them with equipment, and train them, but that is very good news for us and a very positive step forward.

Why is it a positive step? First, it allows us to begin coming off of stop-loss this year. And several months ago Secretary Gates announced that our Army Reserve will begin deploying units without stop-loss in August, our Guard in September, and the Active Force in January. This is something that we have been working toward as we modularize the Army and put it on a rotational cycle. And we—because it is finishing our growth, we are in a position to put ourselves in a place to deploy without stop-loss by 2011 as we had planned.

The second reason it is important that we finish our growth is that it is one of the elements of increasing the time soldiers spend at home. And I have come to realize after two years in this job that the most important thing we can do to get back in balance is to increase the time that our soldiers spend at home, and completing the growth helps us do that.

Dwell time, or the time spent at home, is important for several reasons: One, because it gives our soldiers time to recover from repeated combat tours. And 12 months is not enough, and we have to continue to expand that.

Second, it gives them a more stable preparation time for their next mission. If you are only home for 12 months, you are going back out to the field shortly after you get back, and that is not good enough.

And then lastly, it gives our soldiers time to do other things, to prepare for different kinds of missions besides Iraq and Afghanistan. And I will tell you that in 2007, based on what I thought the force structure would be over the next four years, I thought we wouldn't get quite to one year out, two years back, right away. If we execute the President's Iraq drawdown plan, and I have no reason to doubt that we will, we will actually do better and actually get to a one-to-two or even better ratio. We have to do that. It is very important to the long-term health of the force that we meet that goal in 2011.

The third element of balance is to continue our move away from Cold War formations to formations that are far more relevant in the 21st century. In 2004, we began what we said was the modular conversion of our Army. We are 85 percent done, and that is 85 percent of the way through converting all 300 brigades of the Army to modular designs that are far more relevant today.

The other element of this is we are about two-thirds of our way through rebalancing the force, moving soldiers out of the skills that we needed for the Cold War into skills we need today. Some examples. Since 2004 we have actually stood down 200 tank companies, artillery batteries, and air defense batteries, and we have stood up a corresponding number of military police units, engineer units, Special Forces companies and civil affairs companies, those skills that you hear that we need all the time. That is a big step for us. Together, this represents the largest organizational transformation of the Army since World War II, and we have done it while we are deploying 150,000 soldiers over and back to Iraq and Afghanistan every year.

Fourth, we are moving to put the whole Army on a rotational cycle much like the Navy and Marine Corps have been on for many years. And we believe that is important because we need to be able to sustain the flow of trained and ready forces to combatant commanders, and we need to do it in a manner that provides our soldiers and families a predictable deployment tempo, and so we are moving out on our way to do that.

Fifth, as Secretary Geren mentioned, we are halfway through our rebasing effort, and the combination of BRAC, global reposturing, building facilities for our units that we are growing is resulting in new basing arrangements for 380,000 soldiers, civilians, and families across the Army. And we are about halfway through that, and we will finish by 2011. One of the great benefits of this is the improvement in the quality of facilities for our soldiers and families.

And sixth, and our final objective here, Mr. Chairman, is to increase our strategic flexibility. And the longer our soldiers spend at home, the more time they have time to prepare for other things. And what I have told them is that if you are home for 18 months or less, stay focused on your regular warfare mission. If you are home for 18 months or more, start to rekindle some of the skills that have atrophied while you have been in Iraq and Afghanistan. And so as we build time at home, we will also build resiliency to do other things.

So that is where we are. We have made good progress, but we are not out of the woods yet, and the next 12 to 18 months, I think, will be the most difficult time. And the reason for that is we will actually increase in the number of forces we have deployed slightly before the drawdown begins, but when we get through the next 12 to 18 months, we will be in a much better position.

Now, if I could briefly just make a few comments about how the budget helps us get ourselves back in balance and sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. First of all, sustaining our soldiers and families, number one priority. And the budget contains housing, barracks, child care centers, youth care centers, warrior transition units, and operational facilities, all critical to improving the quality of life of our soldiers. We have put more than \$1.7 billion in the budget for soldiers and families. That is about double where we were two years ago, and we are absolutely committed to delivering on our Soldier Family Action Plan.

I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, I have just been—over the last seven weeks visited five of our stateside installations here and been to Djibouti and Afghanistan. And it continues to be clear to me that our families are indeed the most stretched part of the force, and that is why we are paying such close attention to their support.

On the prepare side, Mr. Chairman, probably the most significant thing that has happened over the last year is the infusion of about 10,000 mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs) into the theater. And I talk to soldiers in Afghanistan, and sometime they gripe a little bit about being hard to drive off the road. But anybody that has been in an MRAP and had an IED blow up underneath them and lived is a convert, and so they are already making a great difference.

Reset, number three. There is \$11 billion in this budget to reset the force, and that is absolutely critical to our ability to keep preparing soldiers properly to go back.

Lastly, on transform, we are in an era of what I call persistent conflict, and I believe that we need land forces that can do four things in this era. One is we have to prevail in a protracted global counterinsurgency campaign. Two, we have to be able to engage to help others build capacity to deny their countries to terrorists. Three, we have to provide support to civil authorities at home and abroad. And fourth, we have to deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors, and we are building an Army to do just that. It is an Army with a versatile mix of tailorable organizations organized on a rotational cycle so that we can provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces to combatant commanders and hedge against uncertainties, and then we can do this at a tempo that our soldiers and families can sustain.

I will close, Mr. Chairman, by talking about one more non-commissioned officer, and that is Staff Sergeant Christopher Waiters, and he received the Distinguished Service Cross, our Nation's second highest award, for valor in April for actions in Baghdad in April 2007. Sergeant Waiters was in a Stryker following a Bradley Fighting Vehicle on a patrol. The Bradley hit an improvised explosive device, blew up, burst into flames. He realized soldiers in there were trapped and couldn't get out. He left his Stryker, fought his way over 100 yards to the burning Bradley, dragged two soldiers out back to his Stryker, treated them and realized there was still another soldier inside. He went back across the open area, back into the vehicle as the ammunition was exploding, realized the soldier inside was dead, went back to his Stryker, got a body bag, went back and recovered the soldier, never leaving a fallen comrade.

So our noncommissioned officers are the glue that is holding this force together at a very important time.

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

[The joint prepared statement of General Casey and Secretary Geren can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you for your excellent statement.

General, Bill Caldwell was kind enough to give me briefings on the two new manuals regarding the wide scope of potential warfare. You and I have discussed that before. And I question, and I ask you to explain to our committee how you can train soldiers to do the entire spectrum of warfare on the one hand, conventional, such as we have had in Korea or elsewhere, or during the Second World War and most places, and on the other hand, insurgency or terrorism type of warfare on the other hand. I think we would be—we would appreciate your explaining.

General CASEY. Thank you very much. And as you suggest, this is not an easy question, and it is one that we have been wrestling with, frankly, for the last two years as we adopted a doctrine of full-spectrum operations.

As we have thought about this, frankly, I was originally in a position where I was thinking conventional war or irregular war, two different things, and the more we thought about this, that is less

and less useful. What we are really talking about is war in the 21st century. And as we view the character of conflict in the 21st century, we believe that our doctrine of full-spectrum operations where we say Army formations will simultaneously apply offense, defense, and stability operations to seize and retain the initiatives and achieve decisive results, we believe that that is a very relevant operational concept not only to fight the wars that we will be fighting, but also to use as a vehicle to train our units and to develop our leaders.

It is not an attempt to train everyone to be good at everything all the time, as you suggest. That is impossible. And, for example, on leader development, what we say is, I don't want someone who is good at everything; I want someone who is very good at their core competency, and that is broad enough and educated enough to deal with a wide range of challenges that may be presented to them.

And as we look to develop our leaders, we are looking to add what we are calling broadening windows onto their officer development time lines, probably late captain and late major. And we put a range of activities in those windows that they could choose from. And so we want broad leaders as well as tactically competent leaders.

So when we publish a new doctrine, as we did in February of 2008, we fully expect that it will take us several years to ingrain that doctrine in the force. And one of the greatest challenges that we have is exactly the question that you ask. But we have given it a lot of thought, and we will continue to evolve in our ability to do that. But it is—we believe it is the right doctrine, and we believe it is doable.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a question that has bothered me for quite some time as to whether our war colleges are producing first-class strategic thinkers and, in addition on that, identifying them, putting them in the right positions and keeping them. I had an interesting discussion with General Peter Pace not long before he retired, and I asked him, how many graduates—and I used the National War College—how many graduates of the National War College could sit down and have a good discussion with the late George C. Marshall? He said three or four. That is not bad. That is good if you are producing that.

Everybody that goes to the National War College, and I am sure that is true with your war college as well, understands strategy. They know it when they see it. They know it is good or not. But those that can actually lead the charge in the thinking is going to be a limited number. How do you identify them? How do you put them in the right position? And how do you keep them, General?

General CASEY. Mr. Chairman, that is another great question. It is something that, as the Director of Strategy and Policy on the Joint Staff several years ago, I came face to face with. And I am inclined to agree with your assessment that we, as a country, have not done a good job of identifying, training, and capturing not only good strategic thinkers, but strategic thinkers who can apply the art of strategy to the complex strategic and operational problems that we are dealing with today like Iraq and Afghanistan.

We have a course out at Leavenworth called the School of Advanced Military Studies. The focus of that course in the past has been largely at the operational level of war. We have augmented that course recently to include a block on strategy. And the thought was to try to identify at the major rank officers who may have the capabilities as they go on to become the strategic thinkers and the strategists that you are talking about. It is going to take us several years, I think, for that program to mature, but it is a step in the right direction. And I very much agree with your assessment here that we have more to do here.

The CHAIRMAN. You have to have it at the right place. And I have seen instances where, the different services, that that person has been overlooked and not used to their potential.

Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Again, gentlemen, welcome.

Chief, when you made your opening comments, you observed that the \$11 billion provided in this budget for reset is critical. I think we can all agree with that. It is absolutely essential. But going back to my opening statement, as I noted, we traditionally in those accounts in supplementals had about \$20 billion on end strength and reset. And the OCO account, now the Overseas Contingency Operation account, which is the budget line for these activities in the base budget, is for this document about \$11 billion. At least on its face that seems to be quite a change. Why is that not cause for concern?

General CASEY. I think the larger part of the change, Congressman, is because we are resetting less units than we were before. Now, as we get—we just got the details of the drawdown plan from General Odierno Monday. And so our staffs now are starting to work that, and we may have to come back at a later time as we look at the timing and the scope of equipment coming out of Iraq and ask for some additional funds. But the money in the budget for right now allows us to reset the units that will be coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan during the period covered by the budget.

Mr. MCHUGH. So, based on conditions then, you feel currently the \$11 billion is an adequate figure, even at a \$9 billion level less, but you reserve the prerogative, if you will, of reevaluating that and trying to plus that account up at some future point.

General CASEY. I do. Once again, once we get an idea of the scope. I mean, there is a lot of stuff that is going to come out of Iraq when we start moving that out, but I don't have a good enough feel for it to put a number on it.

I must say the other big change in the OCO budget was some new rules about procurement and about buying material that wasn't directly related to the war effort. And we had used that in the past, and so that is another reason why the number went down. But, again, \$11 billion gives me the money that I need to reset the units coming out of Afghanistan during this period.

Mr. MCHUGH. On that point, those excluded items, I mean, they still require monies. Where do we get that from?

General CASEY. Well, I mean, over the long haul, Congressman, we are going to have to make judgments about, well, we are going

to fix the things that are coming out, but we have to make—prioritize decisions about where we can invest all of our money.

Mr. MCHUGH. I wish you didn't have to make those choices, but I understand how those kind of things play out in the real world.

Similarly, on procurement, I mentioned General Schoomaker's comments about a post-9/11 environment, and the figure he quoted was \$56 billion procurement shortfall. And the recent history of those accounts has been, as I mentioned in 2008, \$61 billion; in 2009, \$37 (billion); yet in 2010, it is \$30 billion. A lot of us were here, through what seemed to be a pretty good idea at the time, because of the so-called peace dividend, to go on what we now call the procurement holiday. And, of course, those brave folks who sit behind you had to struggle with those judgments that we were all a part of. How does this trend line, particularly the procurement account in 2010 and \$30 billion, assure us that doesn't represent the start of another procurement holiday?

General CASEY. It certainly is too early to tell. And I don't feel that it is. We have benefited substantially from a plus-up in our investment accounts over the last several years, and that has substantially helped us fill some of those holes. We haven't filled all of them, but we have filled more than I would have thought possible, and that is a very good thing.

We, I think, owe this committee and our Department of Defense an affordable modernization strategy that allows us to build a force that continues to be capable into the future, and an investment strategy is a big part of that. And we are actively doing that now, and we will sharpen it over the next year.

Mr. MCHUGH. I take it that, based on your last few comments, that if I were to ask you to provide a figure, as General Schoomaker said, how much are those unfilled holes going to cost, do you have a ballpark figure, or are you still on the calculation tables for that?

General CASEY. I have periodically gone back and said, okay, show me what we received, and help me fill the holes, and I don't have that today. I can get that for you though.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. MCHUGH. I would appreciate that.

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I recognize that we have got some votes coming up. I obviously have other questions, but we have other valuable Members here who want to ask, so I will yield back at this time.

Mr. ORTIZ. [Presiding.] Thank you, first of all, for your service, and good to see both of you.

I had the honor and privilege of serving with my good friend Pete Geren when he was a Member of the congressional Texas delegation. And thank you both for your service and your dedication and keeping our country strong and free, and I hope we can keep it like this.

But one of the things that I am concerned with—and I know that we are about to increase our presence in Afghanistan, and, of course, we will have soldiers in Iraq—is the medical services that the soldiers get. I just read an article the last four or five days about the impact on the health services. And that story came about

because it talked about the contractors who are there. I think we have 3-, 400,000 contractors, and they are utilizing the health facilities that are there for our soldiers, and the impact that is having. And not only that, the article mentioned that the contractors are not paying their bill.

Now, we have our soldiers there, and this is one of the things that may be for another hearing. We are going to find out how the contractors get this contract and whether they are supposed to hire doctors and nurses to treat their workers.

Will this increase of the 17,000 to 20,000 soldiers also put a huge load on your back when they have to treat both our soldiers and the contractors?

Secretary GEREN. Your question of whether the contractors are supposed to reimburse for their medical care, and they are, and we are working through that issue. And whether it is food services or medical services, they are supposed to reimburse. And we are—as we ramp up in Afghanistan, we are ramping up the medical services.

One of the issues that we spent a great deal of time on over the last four months is working on the medical evacuation (Medevac) that will be available for the soldiers in Afghanistan. The terrain and the altitudes pose some special challenges there that we don't have as much of in Iraq. But this build-up, the medical plan to support the build-up, is well developed, and we are resourcing it. We are moving more helicopters into Afghanistan to be able to enhance the Medevac services, and we fully expect that we will have medical care there that will meet the needs of the soldiers not only for physical issues, but mental health as well.

And one of the areas that we have emphasized a great deal over the last couple of years is moving mental health care forward to the soldiers, both having the mental health care at the division level, at the brigade level, in the combat support hospitals. And we even have mobile teams that will go out and provide mental health care. If there is an IED explosion in some area, the mental health professionals go to that site and start working with those soldiers immediately. We have learned a lot about what this environment requires in terms of medical care, and I feel good about the plan that we have for the Afghanistan build-up.

General CASEY. I have nothing to add to that.

Mr. ORTIZ. Okay. One of the things that I have asked before this came about has been training. Are we providing better psychological training for our troops before they are deployed, and even while they are there? This has been a great concern to me and members of my Readiness Subcommittee. Are we doing better as far as providing this type of training for them?

Secretary GEREN. We are. And the Chief and I, I think, both would like to speak to that issue on many different levels. And we are also continuing to look for ways to improve the training, the resiliency training, different ways to judge the mental health preparedness for a soldier. And we look at all these different factors as far as how they are handling the stress of deployments.

But we have some very specific training. We have training, a chain teach program for post-traumatic stress for our soldiers. Literally every soldier in the Army, we are attempting to give them

a modular training on post-traumatic stress disorder, how to spot it in themselves, and what to do about it. Same with suicide prevention. And we have got a program under way right now, we are in the middle of a chain teach program to literally teach every single soldier in the Army about how to identify in himself and his buddies the possibility of a suicidal thoughts, ideation, and what to do about it. General Casey has been working on a project having to do with developing the total soldier fitness and resiliency, a program we are going to emphasize over the course of this summer. And I would like—the Chief might speak about that resiliency training and the program that General Cornum has developed.

General CASEY. If I could, as we look at the challenges, the mental health challenges that we are facing, you know, that is one of the things that worries me most, when people ask me what keeps me up at night. Last year we had 13,000 new cases of post-traumatic stress identified in the Army. That is about double what it was two years before. Now, that is a high number, but the good news is more and more people are feeling comfortable enough to come forward to get the treatment, which is the important thing.

But I was worried that we were being too reactive, that we were getting there after the fact. And so we, over the last year, have been building what we call a comprehensive soldier fitness program, and the intent of this program is to raise mental fitness to the level that we give to physical fitness. And the idea is to build resiliency in all soldiers so that we can enhance their performance.

And a lot of people think that everyone that goes to combat gets post-traumatic stress, and that is just not true. Everyone that goes to combat gets stressed, no doubt about it, but the vast majority have growth experiences because they are challenged by something that is very, very difficult, and they succeed.

And so the idea is to give resilience skills to more and more of the force so that more and more people have growth experience and are able to expand and enhance their performance. And so I would expect in July we will start with this program. It will include master resilience trainers, just like we have master fitness trainers. And our first class of noncommissioned officers is scheduled to go to the University of Pennsylvania next week to begin training. We will ultimately build our own school. There will be a self-diagnostic test that soldiers will take, and they will be given personal feedback on where they stand on a range of things, and then they can connect through the computer to modules that will give them self-help means to help them out. And then there will be standard modules to be given before, during and after deployment and in every one of our developmental schools for our officers, noncommissioned officers. But I believe this is a proactive way to get at this and help us build resilience.

Secretary GEREN. Just something real quickly, though. I don't want it to sound as if we think we have solved the problem. The stress of combat, the stress of multiple deployments takes a heavy toll on soldiers, takes a heavy toll on families, and we have this partnership with the National Institute of Mental Health, a five-year program. We recognize that there is knowledge, experience, and expertise outside of the Army that we could take advantage of,

and that is one of the initiatives that we feel will bear fruit for us going forward.

So we are working very hard in this area. High priority for everybody in the Army. But I don't want it to sound as if we think we have got all the answers, because we don't. We are learning. We are in uncharted waters. We have never been at seven-plus years of war with an All-Volunteer Force. We have never had soldiers do this kind of deployments over and over and over. So we are living and learning, but I can assure you it is a priority for everybody in our Army, and we are working, both inside the Army and outside the Army, to do the best we can in this area.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Thank you, gentlemen for your service.

I am going to ask two brief sets of questions. The first relates to body armor. As you know, our military people frequently are in a quandary. They know they need the protection from the body armor, but it is so heavy and cumbersome that it restricts mobility, and so they decide for some missions that the increased mobility is more important than the protection.

I wonder if we have had an aggressive enough program to reduce the weight of body armor. For instance, for MRAPs and for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) we have set up task forces to look intensively and broadly at what might be done to advance some technology in those areas. I don't—I am not sure that the extent of the Army's R&D efforts to reduce the weight of body armor is large enough. And I wonder, are there any plans to include a program element in the base budget for lightening of body armor and equipment since it is so important to lighten those two?

Mr. BARTLETT. The second set of questions deals with the joint cargo aircraft (JCA). As you know, this was originally an Army vision. The Air Force was a very reluctant partner to this. Some might say that they were dragged kicking and screaming into this relationship.

The Army originally said that they needed 78 of these. In the last couple of weeks, we have had witnesses from both the Army and from the Guard that testified that there was no study that indicated that we needed less than 78 of these. And, by the way, that 78 did not include the aircraft that the Air Force might need. That was to be factored in later.

Now, we understand that the total number is going to be 38, that the program has moved totally over to the Air Force, and I am kind of mystified by that and wonder if you can comment on it.

General, you are quoted this week as telling reporters that you are comfortable with the transfer of this program to the Air Force because they told you they were going to support you down to the last tactical mile. Yet, for several years, the Army has steadfastly defended a program requirement to support tactical delivery supplies and the Guard's homeland defense missions.

Now, if you are convinced that the Air Force is going to meet your needs—and I don't see how they can with 38 planes when the Army thought and we had testimony in the last couple of weeks

that the 78 was still the need—how are we going to support the needs of the Guard back home here?

You also were quoted as saying that we might need more than 38. I agree we need more than 38 planes, and the question is, how are you going to get those and where was the money coming from?

Secretary GEREN. I will take your body armor question.

Mr. BARTLETT. I would rather have you report on the body armor thing, a written response, and if time remains both certainly, but how about first the JCA aircraft and then the armor?

Secretary GEREN. Certainly.

General CASEY. To me, I think there are two issues here for me. First of all is who should have the muscle—and, Congressman, my core competency in the United States Army is not flying cargo aircraft. We can do it. We do it. But, as I looked at this, I need the service. We need to be able to resupply our forward brigades in places that can't be accessed by a C-130. And so I have talked to the last two Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and said, look, I need the capability here. If you all can provide that to me, then I am comfortable with you taking this program over. Norty Schwartz agreed to that.

Now, we are still working out exactly how that transfer will take place and have the requirement to get back to the Department at the end of this month to say how we are going to do that. And the issues you raised with the Guard, whether it is in the Army Guard or the Air Guard, we have got to work through those modalities.

Mr. BARTLETT. You don't believe that the Air Force can get twice the effectiveness out of these aircraft so if the Army needed 38, the Air Force—only needed 78, the Air Force only needs 38 to meet your needs?

General CASEY. That is the second element. The second element is the number of aircraft, and we put a requirement on the table for 78 aircraft, I believe it was.

Mr. BARTLETT. Seventy-eight.

General CASEY. Okay, 78 aircraft, and I believe that requirement is still valid.

Now, what General Schwartz wants to do to merge those aircraft in with this C-130 fleet and whether he ultimately needs the full number to support us in the way that we need to be supported, I think that remains to be seen and discussed.

Mr. BARTLETT. General, I have here a little diagram from a report done by the Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA). I think in our 2008 defense bill we asked for that. They had on the abscissa the cost and on the ordinate they had the effectiveness. Obviously, if you put a little four quadrants there you would like to be in the upper left quadrant where it costs less and is more effective. The only plane they had in the left quadrant out of the C-5, the C-17, and the C-130 was the JCA.

General CASEY. I am happy for that, and it has been a while since I have dealt with ordinances and abscissas.

Mr. BARTLETT. The thing that was the most effective, we are going to buy less than half of what we need. I am having troubling understanding that.

General CASEY. I understand.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Secretary Geren, General Casey, thank you very much for your service to our country.

For those of you who have not been around here as long as I have, I want to tell you, Secretary Geren, you would have been sitting right here, and that he left Congress about 15 years ago so he could spend more time with his family, only to come back and spend even more time working, serving our Nation as the Secretary of the Army. And so I very much appreciate your service to our Nation. I very much on behalf of every family of the troops appreciate the great job you did in turning things around at Walter Reed.

And, General Casey, thank you for your service. Thank you for what you said about the MRAPs. I am in violent agreement with you. I think we are saving kids' lives every day with them.

And towards that end, you know, for years I have been hearing the Army tell me that they train as they fight and they fight as they train. We still have a significant shortfall of MRAPs at the training installations. I very much appreciate General Chiarelli on a very frequent basis letting me know that he is increasing the number, and I appreciate the updates. I still don't think it is enough. I don't think that we honestly say we are training as we fight with the few that we have.

I appreciate that you are going in the right direction. I want to encourage you to get some more for your training installations as we now have the industrial capacity.

And I am going to yield my remaining time to a member of the Ranger Hall of Fame, Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, let me just start by saying that a lot of people make reference to, you know, advocacy for the MRAP in various quarters, but if my history is correct, if my recollection is correct, here in the Armed Services Committee the advocate, the major advocate was Mr. Taylor, and he deserves an awful lot of thanks from an awful lot of people. We would not be where we are where the MRAP is concerned without Mr. Taylor pushing the hell out of it.

General Casey, you and I have already talked a little bit about JCA. I will just second what my good friend has just said on that subject, and I just hope we continue to think about this thing and that the Institute for Defense Analyses' study, done at our request, under your supervision, is taken into account as we move forward thinking about mix where error is concerned and that we not have, sir, a repeat of the sort of back and forth that we experienced where the Caribou was concerned in the Vietnam era, and I just encourage you to sort of look at that history.

Pete, you have been a great Secretary. You have been so responsive, and you care so much about our troops.

I mentioned to you Fort Stewart and the reliance that Fort Stewart and the local community has already incurred with regard—in anticipation of another BCT, and I told you that I was going to get to you a figure of the reliance that this community has—well, the costs that the community has incurred. And the figure that I have—and I can't give you the piece of paper at this point because I want to vet it a little bit more, but it is \$441 million in public and private dollars put into getting ready for this BCT.

It seems to me for a community that has been that great, for a fort that has been that great over many, many years in support of the military, we have got to figure something out here so that, you know, so they don't get harmed to that extent in the course of rethinking how we are going to do our BCTs. Some compensation needs to occur or we just need to rethink this idea or we need to station some folks there so that that reliance just doesn't go to waste.

Secretary GEREN. On that point—and thank you for getting me that number—Fort Stewart community, we have embraced Fort Stewart as long as there has been an installation there. The Army encouraged the community to step out, to build the schools, build the roads, build the housing; and as we have seen with the other two communities that are impacted by the decision, we have seen folks really step up and make the investments to accommodate these soldiers. Those are factors we have got to take into consideration as we move forward. We will continue to go to communities and ask them to do things for soldiers and communities need to be able to—it is a two-way street.

Mr. MARSHALL. It is a partnership.

Secretary GEREN. It certainly is a partnership, and I appreciate the opportunity we have had to discuss it. And it certainly is a factor that, as we move forward and work through this very recent decision that has been made, we have got take that into consideration.

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, I appreciate that response.

In this partnership, it is clear it is a two-way street, as you say; and we have some obligations, frankly, to those communities that have relied extensively on our promise and our request that they do so.

Thank you both for your service and the service of those that you lead.

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] We will try to get one more member's questioning in before we break for the vote. As I understand it, we have three votes, but they will be the last of the day, and we hope that our members will return.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service.

I remember, Secretary Geren, it was 2002 I was at the basic school at Quantico, and we did our 20-mile hump that we had to do. We started at about one in the morning because it was summer, and we wanted to get it done while it was cool out. And Secretary Geren and my father, the former chairman of the Armed Services Committee here, walked with us for three miles. By then, it was like 1:30 in the morning, and they left because they said that they had to catch a flight, and the traffic was really bad. So they were able to get out of the other 17 miles. But great to see you here.

I have got a question. It is kind of a touchy one because there is no right answer to it, I don't think.

First, General Casey, have you signed off on any Medal of Honor citations since, let's say, 2001?

General CASEY. I have. I am trying to—I know I signed off—

Mr. HUNTER. Let me rephrase, for living recipients.

General CASEY. For living recipients, no.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

General CASEY. I don't believe I have, no.

Mr. HUNTER. What I don't understand is either our soldiers and marines and sailors—and this goes for every service—but we are either not as brave as we used to be, there is no more acts of courage and valor, which I don't think is true because I have compared side by side citations from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, to the citations we have now for lesser awards, or the criteria for the Medal of Honor has changed to you have to die.

And that story that you told me about the soldier running back and forth, you compare that to a Korean War, probably Medal of Honor winner, who knows. But there has not been a living recipient that earned a Medal of Honor since Vietnam. The last person to receive it earned it in like 1971.

So the question is why? Are we not as brave? Are we not as courageous? Are there no more acts of valor? Have the criteria changed? Or is it no longer that battlefield commander making the recommendation to get that Medal of Honor approved? Is it brass, which I think—not necessarily brass but possibly civilians in the DOD that are shooting this thing down at higher levels than even those people sitting here today in this room?

General CASEY. I can tell you I can come up at this from two perspectives. One is my time in Iraq, and the other is my time here as chief seeing these awards come across my desk.

The criteria hasn't changed. It has been the criteria—you know, the criteria for the award has been in our regulations and policies for years and hasn't changed. And I have seen neither in Iraq nor here any effort by anyone to consciously downgrade and downplay the valor of our soldiers when it comes to awards.

What I can tell you is what I have seen is every organization has a process where they bring these awards before a board of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and they review them and discuss them to see if they meet the criteria. And I can tell you I have seen some hugely heroic acts and read about some hugely heroic acts, and in my own mind they haven't risen to the level of Medal of Honor.

And sometimes, as you suggest, the line between a Distinguished Service Cross and a Medal of Honor is quite thin, but I can tell you there is absolutely no effort to try to press down the criteria for Medals of Honor.

Mr. HUNTER. So the answer really is that there has not been an act of valor that you have seen in the Army that warrants the Medal of Honor in the last eight years of combat?

General CASEY. For a living person.

Mr. HUNTER. Correct.

General CASEY. A living person. I think I would go back to your opening comment. There is no right answer to this question.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, the right answer is that the criteria has probably changed a little bit, meaning you have to be dead. That is what I would say.

General CASEY. I don't think that is the case. I have never heard that stated. I have never heard that stated.

Mr. HUNTER. There have been Medal of Honor recommendations that have gone all the way up the chain and have been stopped back here in D.C. When everybody on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan concurs, the people that actually saw the combat concur, that that is a Medal of Honor awardee and that the soldier, sailor, marine, or airman should get the Medal of Honor. So it is not just the Army. It is every service. Because not a single one from any service has been given out since the war started.

I would just ask you to think on it. We are trying to track down where the Medals of Honor are being hijacked at. Because they are being stopped, in my opinion. But thank you. If you have anything else you would like to say—

General CASEY. I think I am sitting here reflecting as you are talking about awards that have come across my desk in the last two years where the recommendation to downgrade has been made here in Washington. And maybe one or two—most of the ones I see that are downgraded are downgraded out of theater. But let me get back to you because I would like to find out the answer to that myself.

Mr. HUNTER. Let me, if I may, Mr. Chairman, are there any being processed right now?

General CASEY. There may be. There may be. There may not. I will check that as well.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General. Thank you, Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. We have three votes. We shall return. I urge our members to come back to continue.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Kissell.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General, Secretary, we certainly welcome y'all being here today and all the special guests you have with you. Thank you so much.

I claim Fort Bragg in my part of North Carolina. We come right to the Fort with our district, but I claim Fort Bragg.

One thing I want to just mention to you today—and I am going to do this very quickly, and I am going to be following up on this—I told Chairman Skelton about earlier today. Some people came to my office yesterday—and part of the Army has incorporated this idea already. It is a box that can hold blood at the proper temperature for 72 hours without refrigeration, between 2 degrees and 8 degrees centigrade. It allows blood to be taken to the combat area where we could potentially keep people from bleeding out. Instead of having to carry the wounded soldiers back to where the blood would be, we can carry the blood to the soldiers.

I don't know if y'all are aware of this or not. It was just brought to my attention. I am going to be following up with this, but it is something that could save lives that we are excited to be pursuing it.

Secretary GEREN. I am not familiar with it, but I would certainly like to learn more about it.

Mr. KISSELL. We will follow up, and it is just an exciting development.

The question I have is, the Wounded Warrior Program is such a delicate balance between having individuals who are at the same

time soldiers but also patients. And I spent time at Fort Bragg talking with the people, talking with the patients. I know the intent is wonderful, but sometimes we have these patient soldiers fall between the cracks. I am just wondering what y'all's thoughts are on the Wounded Warrior Program, maybe what—the weaknesses you see, the strengths and maybe how we can improve it as we go forward.

Secretary GEREN. I think we both can speak to that.

I was recently at Bragg and met with the Warrior Transition Unit soldiers. As you know, we started that approach to meeting the needs of soldiers in outpatient care just about two years ago, and we have come a long way in developing a system that is responsive to the needs of the soldiers. It is a great step forward as far as meeting the needs of the soldiers, letting them focus on healing.

We hope—and our goal is to work with them and give them an opportunity to return to service in the military. For those that choose to go on to private life, our goal also is to help them make that transition successfully, work with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), help them develop the skills that they would need to be successful on the outside.

We have had some situations—in fact, we had one at Fort Bragg that I have spent a quite a bit of time working with Medical Command and with the head of the Warrior Transition Unit. It is a delicate balance. You have got soldiers that have—the cadre there are, most cases, they are soldiers that come from—who have served in combat. They are great leaders, and we are selective on who we pick to be in that cadre. They get special pay to be in that cadre. But it is a new skill for them, to lead—to be a noncommissioned officer and lead these soldiers who are patients and they are also soldiers and striking that right balance to help that soldier heal and progress as a soldier. It is a balancing act.

I think, though, it has been a very good approach. By and large, it has worked very well. We have had a very high percentage of soldiers who have returned to active duty or returned to the Guard or Reserve, but I go around and I know General Casey does and other members of our leadership. We meet with these warriors in transition. We ask all the cadre to leave. We ask all the leadership to leave. We want to hear from them without anybody present what can we do to make this better. I always tell them you have got two jobs: one is to heal; the other is to help us make the Warrior Transition Unit approach a success because it is still a work in progress. And the input that we have gotten from these soldiers has helped us continue to tweak it and make it better.

But, by and large, it has been a great success. My hat is off to General Schoomaker and now General Cheek, before him General Tucker. They have done a great job with building it, but we continue to work to make it work better for the soldiers. But I appreciate your interest in that issue.

General CASEY. If I can just add—you asked for things to make it better. We are still not where we need to be on the medical evaluation board process and the bureaucracy of the process. We have got more work to do there, automating it, streamlining it, but that is the area where we need to focus some attention.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir.

Secretary GEREN. Very briefly on that point, Dr. Gates and General Shinseki are working—they have a partnership at that level across the whole Department of Defense, working with the Department of Veterans Affairs, and their commitment is to make that process better. We in the Army are working it, but it is something that personally Dr. Gates and General Shinseki are working.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Geren, a Colorado-specific question. I just wonder if you could talk about for a minute whether or not there is a valid requirement to expand the Piñon Canyon maneuver site in southeastern Colorado.

Secretary GEREN. Congressman, thank you for your support of that initiative.

Expanding the Piñon Canyon training range is a priority for us. We have—there is some debate over what the exact right number of acres is that we need to meet our goals. But we want to—we cherish the relationship we have had with the State of Colorado. We want to be a good neighbor. Colorado has certainly been good neighbors to us. Fort Carson is such an important part of our military, and we have talked to soldiers who serve at Fort Carson. They appreciate very much how their neighbors in Colorado Springs and in Colorado embrace them.

As you and I have talked, I think we got off on the wrong foot in some regards in the effort to expand Piñon Canyon. Our goal is to accomplish the expansion, but we want to do it in a way that accommodates the legitimate needs of the neighbors up there. We want to be a good neighbor. We know that their goal is to be a good neighbor as well.

So we would like to continue to work with you and other State leaders in figuring out a way where we can accomplish what we need and the landowners in that area can get their needs met as well. As you know, we have taken eminent domain off the table. We are not going to force this. We want to work in a cooperative way to get this done. We are hopeful that, with that approach, that over the coming months—or it might take years—we will be able to put it together.

Thank you for your leadership on it. I appreciate your help.

Mr. COFFMAN. Secretary Geren, how would you respond to critics who claim that the Army has not yet adequately justified its need to expand the Piñon Canyon maneuver site?

Secretary GEREN. Well, the original expansion was over 400,000 acres. We have reduced our goals for that, and there is still some debate over exactly what the right size is. But you look at the training requirements we have today and the space we need in order to achieve a realistic representation of what a brigade combat team would experience in combat today, we do need to grow it.

I think most people would say the 400,000 acres that were originally proposed, not needed. We have looked at numbers considerably less than that. But we need to expand it, and it is the accessibility of it, the proximity of it to Fort Carson that saves us a con-

siderable amount of money so we don't have to send those brigades a long way off to get that type of training.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you.

Secretary Geren, I think that there have been expressed some concerns by the local citizens in southeastern Colorado that if the Army gets the authority to expand the Piñon Canyon maneuver site, as to whether or not the Army will live up to their commitment in terms of jobs in those local communities. I wonder if you could respond to that.

Secretary GEREN. Well, our installation command, as well as the civilian leadership, has been working with the local communities; and Trinidad, I believe, is one of the communities that had some concerns about that. And, again, our goal is to make it work for the whole community, make it work for the region, and want to continue to work with those communities so that the economic benefits of that expansion would benefit the region. So we want to listen. We want to figure out how to make it work.

And I know that we have looked at some military construction in certain areas and, also, there are—some of the contractor and the support workforce that would be coming into the region and working with the communities to determine how we best site that so that it does provide the economic benefit to the area.

Mr. COFFMAN. Secretary Geren, quick question. Last question. Are you committed not to go forward with the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) until these issues have been worked out with the local community? What is your position on the Environmental Impact Statement?

Secretary GEREN. Well, I need to get back with you on that. We have limitations that were put upon us by the Congress as far as what kind of funds we could spend as we research this undertaking, and I would have to get back with you on whether or not—what the impact is on the EIS. I don't know the answer to that.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Secretary Geren. Thank you.

Secretary GEREN. We are going to work with the Congress, and the Congress has put some restrictions on it, and I assure you we are going to live up to those restrictions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Massa.

Mr. MASSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, General, thank you very much for being here. Later in the day, I had the pleasure of just canceling a flight to be able to sit and have a conversation, and I appreciate your patience.

I, also, as a veteran myself, honor your service and recognize all that you and your team do for our troops every day in the field.

That having been said, I would like to register a very significant concern that I have been in conversations with leadership of the United States Army now for some 120 days.

As I look at the future of communications in the United States Army, a field of endeavor not entirely unknown based on my own personal professional past, I am exceptionally concerned about the more than \$700 million that is about to be spent on a single-channel, frequency-hopping Very High Frequency (VHF) radio, when al-

ternate technologies that are far more compatible with the future needs of the force are extant in the commercial world. I speak today of Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radios.

Satisfying an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and a requirement that is more than 25 years old is not what I consider to be forward thinking. I am certainly not advocating on behalf of a single company, corporation, producer or manufacturer but, rather, on the reality that in the last 25 years we have seen tremendous increases in mobile telecommunications and radio technologies. And from my own personal experience in the field, if you have the opportunity to offer a platoon leader, a sergeant, a squad leader, a handheld radio that has a single VHF channel operation capability, or one at the same time with a flick of a switch that gives you VHF, Ultra High Frequency (UHF), satellite, satellite data capability for the same cost, I have yet to meet a soldier in uniform that does not take the more capable radio.

So I register today officially exceptional concern about some \$700 million that is about to be spent on a radio that is both fundamentally incompatible with your number one acquisition priority, which is the future combat system, and the needs in the field. I don't know how else to place my words on the table for the official record.

I have had conversation after conversation after conversation with general officers, but, more importantly, the same conversations with individuals fresh home from Iraq who are the end users of these communication devices who, without my prompting, concur with the fact that we are about to waste one heck of a lot of money; and in a budgetary environment where literally we are counting by billions, which is something I don't quite understand, I think we are about to make a horrific mistake.

And, Mr. Secretary, I speak to your announcement that this contract award is about to be made. I worked very hard in a supplemental to have funds reprogrammed to higher priorities, but I don't have the capability to change this \$700 plus million dollars that you are about to spend other than to, with the utmost of respect and professionalism, ask you and your team to reconsider.

Your comments, sir.

Secretary GEREN. Well, thank you for raising that issue. But, as you know, we are—we do have a competition out to complete the buy—

Mr. MASSA. Sir, if I could just—and I am sorry to do this, because I know it sounds disrespectful.

The Army is competing a single channel VHF radio. That is not competition. It just doesn't work that way, sir. And I am sorry to be contrary. I am not trying to be confrontational, but the statement that the Army is competing is just not accurate.

Secretary GEREN. We have a competition that is in the final stages to complete the buy of the SINCGARS radio, 56,000—the last 56,000 of the buy. We are making tremendous investments in the next-generation radio. This will complete our buy that has been going on for years, and it is the last step of the process, and we will be announcing sometime fairly soon the outcome of that decision.

Mr. MASSA. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry, for the record. I absolutely disagree with you.

Secretary GEREN. I respect that.

Mr. MASSA. And the facts do not bear out that statement. I am sorry. We are competing a single-channel SINCGARS radio that does not match up with the needs of the force. And this is not my opinion. This is the opinion of warriors and combatants who have returned with this story to me, not anecdotally but in overwhelming preponderance of evidence. It is evidence of an acquisition process that is so unable to react to the requirements on the field that we are buying 53,000 radios—

Secretary GEREN. Fifty-six.

Mr. MASSA. I am sorry, 56,000 radios. Thank you for making my point for me. And every general officer with whom I have had this conversation, every single soldier with whom I have had this conversation, when given the opportunity for to buy better technology for the same price would rather do that. It is an example of an acquisition process that has gone awry, and I can't agree with you, but thank you for stating your position.

Secretary GEREN. I appreciate your observations. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mike Rogers, please.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

I want to thank both of you for being here and for your service. It is very much appreciated by the whole country.

I want to talk to you about the budget request on the Stryker. As you know, we have—I keep hearing calls for additional variants on the Stryker, and I hear that the Army wants to keep production warm in anticipation of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). And given the significant investments we have made in the Stryker, you know, 260 of these Strykers in the supplemental and \$390 million for enhancements and modifications, what do you see the Stryker of the future? Where is it going?

Either one of you or both of you can take that.

Secretary GEREN. We are looking at the future force mix, examining what it is going to look like in the years ahead, and it is possible at the end of this process that the decision will be made that some of the heavy brigades could become Stryker brigades. The Stryker brigades have served to great effect in the current conflict. It has been an extraordinarily successful program, and we are working within the Army and working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), with the QDR, and I think that at the end of this process it is—the issue of the future of the Stryker could end up being in a different place than it is today. It is hard to say where it will come out, but I think it is quite likely that we will see an expanded role for the Stryker in the future. That is looking at a crystal ball.

Chief, you want to add some to that?

General CASEY. I mentioned in my opening statement about the need to have a versatile mix of tailorable organizations organized on a rotational cycle. Because, as we look to the future, one thing we know is we never get it quite right. So we want to have available with every rotational cycle a mix of capabilities, Strykers, heavies, lights, and probably some lights, infantry units on MRAPs, and things like that. That is the type of thinking we are doing as

part of this QDR to build the versatile mix of forces that we need for the 21st century. And I agree with the Secretary that it is likely or possible that the Strykers could have an increased role in that.

Mr. ROGERS. Great.

The Secretary made some reference to future combat systems. Obviously, y'all have made—there have been proposed some significant cuts in these combat systems. My concern is or the thing I would like you to respond to is if we continue to pursue these cuts, is there a chance it is going to make us much more reliant on our current legacy fleet, things like the M113, which we heretofore have been phasing out?

General CASEY. Thank you. The only element of the future combat systems program that has been canceled is the manned ground vehicle, and I include the non-line-of-sight cannon as part of that.

As we went through the deliberations here, first of all, the Secretary of Defense is very comfortable with the things we call the spinouts, that is the network and everything else. And that is going forward. It is not only going forward. It is going forward to all of the brigades, not just some of them.

When it came to the manned ground vehicle, I was not able to convince the Secretary of Defense that we had incorporated enough of the lessons learned from the current operations we were in into that manned ground vehicle. And so what he asked us to do was stop, take out a clean sheet of paper, incorporate the lessons that we have learned, use the technology that we have developed in the future combat systems. Because we know where vehicle technology is, because that program has helped us get there, and put it together and come back with a new ground combat vehicle that will be full spectrum. It wouldn't necessarily be optimized for major combat operations like the tanks and the Bradley but would maybe be able to do that.

So that is what we are doing, and we expect to come back and have a new concept design after Labor Day. And then we will bring that forward, and we want to work very closely with Congress as we are working with the Department to get a program that is supported. But we need a fighting vehicle, and this ground combat vehicle will be a fighting vehicle.

And we have also put on a time horizon of five to seven years, which tells us we need to use the technology that is available today to go forward; and I think that will help us. That will actually deliver that ground combat vehicle around the same time that we would have had it at our future combat systems program. So we are treating this as an—

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. Thank you both for your service.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for being here.

And, Mr. Secretary, congratulations on your success and service. You prove there can be life after Congress.

And, General, I found out from a mutual friend of ours, Mike Flack, who is the director of the Columbia Metropolitan Airport, that the three of us were cadets, Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) cadets, at Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Annville, Pennsylvania, during the summer of 1968.

So Mike and I are very impressed and appreciative of your success; and I am grateful to be here and, in particular, because my dad served with the Flying Tigers, Army Air Corps. I am a son of a veteran. I served 31 years in the Guard and Reserve myself, but I am particularly grateful. I have four sons serving in the military; and three them, of course, have chosen to serve in the Army National Guard. One of our sons served field artillery in Iraq. Another has served signal in Egypt. The fourth guy just joined the National Guard, but he is Army ROTC. So I am very, very much appreciative of your promoting national defense but providing opportunity for young people to serve our country.

And, Secretary Geren, I am very grateful to be on the Military Personnel Subcommittee with Chairwoman Susan Davis. We have been reviewing problems in the past couple of years in regard to suicide, sexual assaults, criminal behavior, drugs. Has this Army's waiver policy contributed to this problem, and is the quality of recruits what it should be?

Secretary GEREN. Let me first say that only 3 out of 10 young people today meet the requirements to join the United States Army, meet the academic, meet the moral and the physical requirements to be a soldier today, top 30 percent of our kids.

The other screen that tells you a whole lot about the young men and women who join the Army is they are joining the Army in the middle of a war. So we are getting outstanding young men and women in the Army.

As far as the issues you have raised, we have examined very closely the performance of the soldiers that have come in under the waiver process, and I would say none of the issues that you raise have we found any connection between waivers and those issues. In fact, we just recently finished a look to look at soldiers who came in under waivers and suicide rates, and the suicide rate among the soldiers who came in under waivers was lower than it was for those that didn't.

You mentioned sexual assault. If you are a registered sexual offender, you don't get in the United States Army, period. We have found no connection between the number of waivers and the instance of sexual assault.

We watch these issues very closely. We have learned with our recent study of waivers that there are a couple of categories that have not performed as we would like them to.

We have been giving drug and alcohol waivers. Those are people who test positive for drug and alcohol. We have been working with them, in some cases going through this 10-step process and giving them a waiver, providing them an opportunity to join the Army. We have found through this recent review that we have done that the recidivism rate for those soldiers is higher than the other soldiers who came in through other processes. So we have recently closed that category. You are no longer eligible if you test positive for drug or alcohol. You are no longer able to get into the Army.

So our recruiting process has been a living and learning. As we work with the waiver process, we will open up and try some areas. If we learn that there are problems associated with it, we shut that down. But, by and large, the young men and women who joined the Army over the last eight years, those who have come in under

waivers have performed with great distinction, in many cases, achieved valor awards at a higher rate than those who came in the other category.

It is a very labor-intensive process to come in under a waiver. It is, as I mentioned a 10-step process for every one of those. It is really hand-picking. But as we learn about some of those categories' performance, if there are problems, we are shaping the waiver process to work them out of the system.

Mr. WILSON. Also, in our subcommittee we have been following this situation of sexual assaults and response. You had announced in January specific positions to be added. What is the status on adding positions to address this situation?

Secretary GEREN. If you look at the way the private sector handles sexual assault investigation and prosecution, it has become a very specialized area, with specialized investigators, specialized prosecutors. We are recreating that in the Army, and we are using the highly qualified expert authority that y'all gave us a couple of years ago to go out and get the very best people in the outside world in investigation and in prosecution and building within the Army what we believe will be one of the best teams in that area in the country.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. We are nearing the end, and I couldn't let you leave without, General, talking about the joint cargo aircraft. How would you like to tell us about the decisions and what went into them regarding the joint cargo aircraft?

General CASEY. Sure, chairman, I would be happy to.

We have been working on this program for a while. When I got there, I reviewed the program, and it is something that we need. We need to be able to supply our units in forward bases out of airstrips that can accommodate a C-130, and we are doing that now in places in Iraq and Afghanistan with the Sherpa.

But as I thought my way through that, and I look at the range of things that the Army is doing these days, as I said earlier, you know, flying cargo aircraft isn't my core competency. It is Air Force's core competency. And I thought that if I could get the Air Force to take over the planes and give me the service, that would be the best of all worlds.

So I worked it with General Moseley. We weren't able to bring it to conclusion. And then I worked it again with General Schwartz, and we had a broad conceptual agreement. We still have to work out the details of how we will do this, and we have until the end of May to come back and tell the Department.

So it is one of those things that I felt was an Air Force mission. As long as I got the service, they are the experts, and so I felt comfortable giving that to them.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the Army National Guard, joint cargo aircraft units?

General CASEY. That is part of the details that has to be worked out. You know, initially in my thinking, I expected that would stay in the Guard. It might be the Air Guard, and we might work something creative where our Army pilots shift over to the Air Guard for a time until they retire.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have to change an entire unit to the Air Force Guard?

General CASEY. That is one of the things—we have asked General Craig McKinley, Director of the Guard, to work through that and help us do that with the Army Guard and the Air Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. When will you have a final decision on that?

General CASEY. We owe a report by the end of May back to the Department on the implementation. I don't know that we will have the whole memorandum of understanding, you know, to do all this by then, but we will have a preliminary report by the end of the month.

The CHAIRMAN. Will that include the Army National Guard units, your requirement at the end of May?

General CASEY. I don't know that we will have complete resolution on that by the end of May, but the Guard will be very much included in the discussions. They are very much included.

The CHAIRMAN. If you transfer Army National Guard cargo aircraft units to the Air Force National Guard, wouldn't there be a problem in retaining rank and longevity, et cetera, for your—say, the sergeants and the corporals and the captains?

General CASEY. Chairman, I don't know. As I said, we have to work through the modalities of all that. I said that was a possibility. I wouldn't want anyone to leave here thinking that that is what we have decided to do. That is one of the options.

The CHAIRMAN. If you did that, you would have to guarantee that persons who have been in the Army National Guard for years and years will not be penalized should he wear a different color of uniform doing the same mission.

General CASEY. Absolutely. Anything we do will take into consideration the people aspects of this.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

John McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. None, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you so much for being with us. Appreciate your testimony, and we are very grateful for the hard work that you do for our soldiers.

[Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MAY 14, 2009

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MAY 14, 2009

House Armed Services Committee
Chairman Ike Skelton
Opening Statement
Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2010 Army Budget Request

May 14, 2009

“This afternoon, the House Armed Services Committee meets to receive testimony on the Fiscal Year 2010 Army Budget Request. Our witnesses today are: the Honorable Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army; and General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army. Gentlemen welcome, and thank you for coming to this hearing.

“Afghanistan and Iraq have driven big changes for the Army. New doctrine manuals on Counterinsurgency, Stability Operations, and Security Force Assistance have all been issued in the past few years and all point to the increasing emphasis on balancing the efforts of the Army between traditional conventional war and stability operations and irregular warfare. And this too may drive force structure changes, as the Army looks to build the Advice and Assist Brigades the President mentioned as part of changing our mission in Iraq.

“What these will look like, whether we institutionalize these brigades, and if and how they will be used in the future are all significant questions that should be answered.

“Budgets, as we often say, are the actual demonstration of our strategy and the way ahead. I think the Army budget that has been submitted certainly points to big changes. The cancellation of the Future Combat

Systems (FCS) vehicle; the decision to only build 45, instead of 48, active duty combat brigades; and the hand-off of the Joint Cargo Aircraft program to the Air Force are just a few of the very significant changes in this budget. I am sure our committee will have many, many questions about what these program changes signal for the future of our Army.

“At the same time we ask about the future, we shouldn’t lose sight of the present. Army readiness levels are still unacceptably low. I hope we will hear today about how we will fix that problem, particularly since this budget appears to flatline operations and maintenance funding.

“Army recruitment and retention, on the other hand, seem to have recovered significantly from the levels of a few years ago, although it remains to be seen what happens when the economy begins to recover. In the past, we have moved too aggressively to cut funding for recruitment and retention, and I hope we will hear that this is not the case with this budget.

“Back home, this budget appears to continue the commitment to take care of our troops and their families by funding a 2.9 percent pay raise and increasing funding to care for the wounded and injured. Best of all, this budget moves these funds to the base budget, institutionalizing them for the future.

“Family support programs, such as child care and spousal support also fare well. I have long said that our people and their families are our first priority, and I am glad that this budget appears to adopt that point of view.

“In short, this budget signals many changes for the future. Some, like the continued commitment to our personnel, are welcome. Other decisions, however, will no doubt generate many questions. Decisions made today will develop the Army of the future and should not be

entered into lightly. We need to understand the future environment that is envisioned and the way these programs will address them. I hope our witnesses here today will help us with that.

“I now turn to my friend from New York, the Ranking Member, for any comments he might care to make.”

**A STATEMENT ON THE
POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 2009**

submitted by

**THE HONORABLE PETE GEREN and
GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY JR.**

to the Committees and Subcommittees of the

UNITED STATES SENATE

and the

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

1ST SESSION, 111TH CONGRESS

MAY 2009

2009 ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT

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¹ Required by National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 (hard copy separate)
^{*} Online

2009 ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT

"As we consider the road that unfolds before us, we remember with humble gratitude those brave Americans who, at this very hour, patrol far-off deserts and distant mountains. They have something to tell us, just as the fallen heroes who lie in Arlington whisper through the ages. We honor them not only because they are guardians of our liberty, but because they embody the spirit of service; a willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves. And yet, at this moment — a moment that will define a generation — it is precisely this spirit that must inhabit us all."

**President Barack Obama
Inaugural Address, January 2009**



Introduction

Our combat-seasoned Army, although stressed by seven years of war, is a resilient and professional force—the best in the world. The Army—Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve—continues to protect our Nation, defend our national interests and allies, and provide support to civil authorities in response to domestic emergencies.

The Army is in the midst of a long war, the third longest in our Nation's history and the longest ever fought by our All-Volunteer Force. More than one million of our country's men and women have deployed to combat; more than 4,500 have sacrificed their lives, and more than 31,000 have been wounded. Our Army continues to be the leader in this war, protecting our national interests while helping others to secure their freedom. After seven years of continuous combat, our Army remains out of balance, straining our ability to sustain the All-Volunteer Force and maintain strategic depth. The stress on our force will not ease in 2009 as the demand on our forces will remain high. In 2008, the Army made significant progress to restore balance, but we still have several challenging years ahead to achieve this vital goal.

As we remain committed to our Nation's security and the challenge of restoring balance, we remember that the Army's most precious resources are our dedicated Soldiers, their Families, and the Army Civilians who support them. They are the strength of the Army—an Army that is The Strength of the Nation.

Strategic Context

An Era of Persistent Conflict

The global security environment is more ambiguous and unpredictable than in the past. Many national security and intelligence experts share the Army's assessment that the next several decades will be characterized by persistent conflict—protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. We live in a world where global terrorism and extremist ideologies, including extremist movements such as Al Qaeda, threaten our personal freedom and our national interests. We face adept and ruthless adversaries who exploit technological, informational, and cultural differences to call the disaffected to their cause. Future operations in this dynamic environment will likely span the spectrum of conflict from peacekeeping operations to counterinsurgency to major combat.

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May 5, 2009

Our Nation is in its eighth year of war, a war in which our Army—Active, Guard, and Reserve—is fully engaged. The Army has grown to more than one million Soldiers, with 710,000 currently serving on active duty and more than 255,000 deployed to nearly 80 countries worldwide. Our Soldiers and Army Civilians have performed magnificently, not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in defense of the homeland and in support to civil authorities in responding to domestic emergencies.

Much of this success is due to our Noncommissioned Officers. This year, we specifically recognize their professionalism and commitment. To honor their sacrifices, celebrate their contributions, and enhance their professional development, we have designated 2009 as the "Year of the Army NCO." Our NCO Corps is the glue holding our Army together in these challenging times.

Today, we are fighting a global war against violent extremist movements that threaten our freedom. Violent extremist groups such as Al Qaeda, as well as Iran-backed factions, consider themselves at war with western democracies and even certain Muslim states. Looking ahead, we see an era of persistent conflict—protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. In this era, the Army will continue to have a central role in providing full spectrum forces necessary to ensure our security.

The Army remains the best led, best trained, and best equipped Army in the world, but it also remains out of balance. The demand for our forces over the last several years has exceeded the sustainable supply. It has stretched our Soldiers and their Families and has limited our flexibility in meeting other contingencies. In 2007, our Army initiated a plan based on four imperatives: Sustain our Soldiers and Families; Prepare our forces for success in the current conflicts; Reset returning units to rebuild readiness; and Transform to meet the demands of the 21st Century. We have made progress in all of these and are on track to meet the two critical challenges we face: restoring balance and setting conditions for the future.

Our Army is the Strength of this Nation, and this strength comes from our values, our ethos, and our people—our Soldiers and the Families and Army Civilians who support them. We remain dedicated to improving their quality of life. We are committed to providing the best care and support to our wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers—along with their Families. And our commitment extends to the Families who have lost a Soldier in service to our Nation. We will never forget our moral obligation to them.

We would not be able to take these steps were it not for the support and resources we have received from the President, Secretary of Defense, Congress, and the American people. We are grateful. With challenging years ahead, the Soldiers, Families, and Civilians of the United States Army require the full level of support requested in this year's base budget and Overseas Contingency Operations funding request. Together, we will fight and win the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, restore balance, and transform to meet the evolving challenges of the 21st Century. Thank you for your support.

George W. Casey, Jr.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Pete Geren
Secretary of the Army

AMERICA'S ARMY: THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION

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Global Trends

Several global trends are evident in this evolving security environment. Globalization has increased interdependence and prosperity in many parts of the world. It also has led to greater disparities in wealth which set conditions that can foster conflict. The current global recession will further increase the likelihood of social, political, and economic tensions.

Technology, which has enabled globalization and benefited people all over the world, also is exploited by extremists to manipulate perceptions, export terror, and recruit people who feel disenfranchised or threatened.

Population growth increases the likelihood of instability with the vast majority of growth occurring in urban areas of the poorest regions in the world. The limited resources in these areas make young, unemployed males especially vulnerable to anti-government and radical ideologies. The inability of governments to meet the challenges of rapid population growth fuels local and regional conflicts with potential global ramifications.

Increasing demand for resources, such as energy, water, and food, especially in developing economies, will increase competition and the likelihood of conflict. Climate change and natural disasters further strain already limited resources, increasing the potential for humanitarian crises and population migrations.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remains a vital concern. Growing access to technology increases the potential for highly disruptive or even catastrophic events involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons or materials. Many terrorist groups are actively seeking WMD. Failed or failing states, lacking the capacity or will to maintain territorial control, can provide safe havens for terrorist groups to plan and export operations, which could include the use of WMD.

These global trends, fueled by local, regional, and religious tensions, create a volatile security environment with increased potential for conflict. As these global trends contribute to an era of persistent conflict, the character of conflict in the 21st Century is changing.

The Evolving Character of Conflict

Although the fundamental nature of conflict is timeless, its ever-evolving character reflects the unique conditions of each era. Current global trends include a diverse range of complex operational challenges that alter the manner and timing of conflict emergence, change the attributes and processes of conflict, require new techniques of conflict resolution, and demand much greater integration of all elements of national power. The following specific characteristics of conflict in the 21st Century are especially important.

Diverse actors, especially non-state actors, frequently operate covertly or as proxies for states. They are not bound by internationally recognized norms of behavior, and they are resistant to traditional means of deterrence.

Hybrid threats are dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal capabilities. They make pursuit of singular approaches ineffective, necessitating innovative solutions that integrate new combinations of all elements of national power.

Conflicts are increasingly waged among the people instead of around the people. Foes seeking to mitigate our conventional advantages operate among the people to avoid detection, deter counterstrikes, and secure popular support or acquiescence. To secure lasting stability, the allegiance of indigenous populations becomes the very object of the conflict.

Conflicts are becoming more unpredictable. They arise suddenly, expand rapidly, and continue for uncertain durations in unanticipated, austere locations. They are expanding to areas historically outside the realm of conflict such as cyberspace and space. Our nation must be able to rapidly adapt its capabilities in order to respond to the increasingly unpredictable nature of conflict.

Indigenous governments and forces frequently lack the capability to resolve or prevent conflicts. Therefore, our Army must be able to work with these governments, to create favorable conditions for security and assist them in building their own military and civil capacity.

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Interagency partnerships are essential to avoid and resolve conflicts that result from deeply rooted social, economic, and cultural conditions. Military forces alone cannot establish the conditions for lasting stability.

Images of conflicts spread rapidly across communication, social, and cyber networks by way of 24-hour global media and increased access to information through satellite and fiber-optic communications add to the complexity of conflict. Worldwide media coverage highlights the social, economic, and political consequences of local conflicts and increases potential for spillover, creating regional and global destabilizing effects.

Despite its evolving character, conflict continues to be primarily conducted on land; therefore, landpower—the ability to achieve decisive results on land—remains central to any national security strategy. Landpower secures the outcome of conflict through an integrated application of civil and military capabilities, even when landpower is not the decisive instrument. The Army, capable of full spectrum operations as part of the Joint Force, continues to transform itself to provide the prompt, sustainable, and dominant effects necessary to ensure our Nation's security in the 21st Century.

Global Commitments

In this era of persistent conflict, the Army remains essential to our Nation's security as a campaign capable, expeditionary force able to operate effectively with Joint, interagency, and multinational partners across the full spectrum of conflict. Today, the Army has 243,000 Soldiers deployed in nearly 80 countries around the world, with 140,000 Soldiers in active combat theaters. To fulfill the requirements of today's missions, including defending the homeland and supporting civil authorities, the Army has over 710,000 Soldiers on active duty from all components. Additionally, 258,000 Army Civilians are performing critical missions in support of the Army. More than 4,100 of our Civilians and more than 33,000 U.S. contractors are forward-deployed, performing vital missions abroad.


The Army's primary focus continues to be combined counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan, while training each nation's indigenous forces and building their ability to establish peace and maintain stability. Our Army is also preparing ready and capable forces for other national security requirements, though at a reduced rate. These forces support combatant commanders in a wide variety of military missions across the entire spectrum of conflict. Examples of Army capabilities and recent or ongoing missions other than combat include:

- Responding to domestic incidents by organizing, training, and exercising brigade-sized Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosive Consequence Management Reaction Forces—the first in 2008, the second in 2009, and the third in 2010
- Supporting the defense of South Korea, Japan, and many other friends, allies, and partners
- Conducting peacekeeping operations in the Sinai Peninsula and the Balkans
- Supporting the establishment of Africa Command, headquartered in Germany, and its Army component, U.S. Army Africa, headquartered in Italy
- Providing military observers and staff officers to UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, the Republic of Georgia, Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Chad
- Conducting multinational exercises that reflect our longstanding commitments to our allies and alliances
- Supporting interagency and multinational partnerships with technical expertise, providing critical support after natural disasters
- Continuing engagements with foreign militaries to build partnerships and preserve coalitions by training and advising their military forces
- Supporting civil authorities in responding to domestic emergencies
- Participating, most notably by the Army National Guard, in securing our borders and conducting operations to counter the flow of illegal drugs

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Army Global Commitments



- Supporting operations to protect against WMD and prevent their proliferation
- Protecting and eliminating chemical munitions

Current combat operations, combined with other significant demands placed on our forces, have stressed our Army, our Soldiers, and their Families. While we remain committed to providing properly manned, trained, and equipped forces to meet the diverse needs of our combatant commanders, we face two critical challenges.

Two Critical Challenges

While fully supporting the demands of our Nation at war, our Army faces two major challenges—**restoring balance** to a force experiencing the cumulative effects of seven years of war and **setting**

conditions for the future to fulfill our strategic role as an integral part of the Joint Force.

The Army is out of balance. The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies. Even as the demand for our forces in Iraq decreases, the mission in Afghanistan and other requirements will continue to place a high demand on our Army for years to come. Current operational requirements for forces and insufficient time between deployments require a focus on counterinsurgency training and equipping to the detriment of preparedness for the full range of military missions. Soldiers, Families, support systems, and equipment are stressed due to lengthy and repeated deployments. Overall, we are consuming readiness as fast as we can build it. These conditions must change. Institutional and

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operational risks are accumulating over time and must be reduced in the coming years.

While restoring balance, we must simultaneously set conditions for the future. Our Army's future readiness will require that we continue to modernize, adapt our institutions, and transform Soldier and leader development in order to sustain an expeditionary and campaign capable force for the rest of this Century.

Modernization efforts are essential to ensure technological superiority over a diverse array of potential adversaries. Our Army must adapt its institutions to more effectively and efficiently provide trained and ready forces for combatant commanders. We will continue to transform how we train Soldiers and how we develop agile and adaptive leaders who can overcome the challenges of full spectrum operations in complex and dynamic operating environments. We also must continue the transformation of our Reserve Components to an operational force to achieve the strategic depth necessary to successfully sustain operations in an era of persistent conflict.

Through the dedicated efforts of our Soldiers, their Families, and Army Civilians, combined with continued support from Congressional and national leadership, we are making substantial progress toward these goals. Our continued emphasis on the Army's four imperatives—Sustain, Prepare, Reset, and Transform—has focused our efforts. We recognize, however, that more remains to be done in order to restore balance and set conditions for the future.

Restoring Balance: The Army's Four Imperatives

Sustain

We must sustain the quality of our All-Volunteer Force. Through meaningful programs, the Army is committed to providing the quality of life deserved by those who serve our Nation. To sustain the force, we are focused on recruitment and retention; care of Soldiers, Families, and Civilians; care for our wounded Warriors; and support for the Families of our fallen Soldiers.

Recruit and Retain

- **Goal** – Recruit quality men and women through dynamic incentives. Retain quality Soldiers and Civilians in the force by providing improved quality of life and incentives.
- **Progress** – In 2008, nearly 300,000 men and women enlisted or reenlisted in our All-Volunteer Army. In addition, the Army created the Army Preparatory School to offer incoming recruits the opportunity to earn a GED in order to begin initial entry training. All Army components are exceeding the 90% Tier 1 Education Credential (high school diploma or above) standard for new recruits. In addition, our captain retention incentive program contributed to a nearly 90 percent retention rate for keeping experienced young officers in the Army.

Care of Soldiers, Families, and Civilians

- **Goal** – Improve the quality of life for Soldiers, Families, and Civilians through the implementation of the Soldier and Family Action Plan and the Army Family Covenant. Garner support of community groups and volunteers through execution of Army Community Covenants.
- **Progress** – The Army hired more than 1,000 new Family Readiness Support Assistants to provide additional support to Families with deployed Soldiers. We doubled the funding to Family programs and services in 2008. We began construction on 72 Child Development Centers and 11 new Youth Centers and fostered community partnerships by signing 80 Army Community Covenants. Our Army initiated the "Shoulder to Shoulder, No Soldier Stands Alone" program to increase suicide awareness and prevention.

The Army also committed to a 5-year, \$50 Million study by the National Institute for Mental Health for practical interventions for mitigating suicides and enhancing Soldier resiliency. In addition, the Army implemented the Intervene, Act, Motivate (I A.M. Strong) Campaign with a goal of eliminating sexual harassment and sexual assault in the Army. To

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enhance the investigation and prosecution of criminal behavior, the Army's Criminal Investigation Command and Office of The Judge Advocate General have taken new measures to support victims, investigate crimes and hold offenders accountable. The Army also has provided better access to quality health care, enhanced dental readiness programs focused on Reserve Component Soldiers, improved Soldier and Family housing, increased access to child care, and increased educational opportunities for Soldiers, children, and spouses.

Warrior Care and Transition

- Goal – Provide world-class care for our wounded, ill, and injured Warriors through properly resourced Warrior Transition Units (WTUs), enabling these Soldiers to remain in our Army or transition to meaningful civilian employment consistent with their desires and abilities.
- Progress – The Army established 36 fully operational WTUs and 9 community-based health care organizations to help our wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers focus on their treatment, rehabilitation, and transition through in-patient and out-patient treatment. We initiated programs to better diagnose and treat Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Traumatic Brain Injury and other injuries through advanced medical research. We also have made investments in upgrading our clinics and hospitals including a \$1.4B investment in new hospitals at Forts Riley, Benning, and Hood.

Support Families of Fallen Comrades

- Goal – Assist the Families of our fallen comrades and honor the service of their Soldiers.
- Progress – The Army is developing and fielding Survivor Outreach Services, a multi-agency effort to care for the Families of our Soldiers who made the ultimate sacrifice. This program includes benefit specialists who serve as subject matter experts on benefits and entitlements, support coordinators who provide long-term advocacy, and financial counselors who assist in budget planning.

Prepare

We must prepare our force by readying Soldiers, units, and equipment to succeed in the current conflicts, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. We continue to adapt institutional, collective, and individual training to enable Soldiers to succeed in combat and prevail against adaptive and intelligent adversaries. We are equally committed to ensuring Soldiers have the best available equipment to both protect themselves and maintain a technological advantage over our adversaries. To prepare our force, we continue to focus on growing the Army, training, equipping, and better supporting the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process.

Grow the Army

- Goal – Accelerate the end strength growth of the Army so that by 2010 the Active Component has 547,400 Soldiers and the National Guard has 358,200 Soldiers. Grow the Army Reserve to 206,000 Soldiers by 2012 even as the Army Reserve works an initiative to accelerate that growth to 2010. Grow the Army's forces to 73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and approximately 227 Support Brigades with enabling combat support and combat service support structure by 2011. Simultaneously develop the additional facilities and infrastructure to station these forces.
- Progress – With national leadership support, our Army has achieved our manpower growth in all components during 2009. The Army grew 32 Modular Brigades in 2008 (7 Active Component Brigades and 25 Brigades in the Reserve Component). This growth in the force, combined with reduced operational deployments from 15 months to 12 months, eased some of the strain on Soldiers and Families.

Training

- Goal – Improve the Army's individual, operational, and institutional training for full spectrum operations. Develop the tools and technologies that enable more effective and efficient training through live, immersive, and adaptable venues that prepare Soldiers and

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leaders to excel in the complex and challenging operational environment.

- **Progress** – The Army improved training facilities at home stations and combat training centers, increasing realism in challenging irregular warfare scenarios. Army Mobile Training Teams offered career training to Soldiers at their home station, preventing them from having to move away for schooling and providing more time for them with their Families. Our Army continues to improve cultural and foreign language skills.

Equipment

- **Goal** – Provide Soldiers effective, sustainable, and timely equipment through fully integrated research and development, acquisition, and logistical sustainment. Continue modernization efforts such as the Rapid Fielding Initiative and the Rapid Equipping Force, using a robust test and evaluation process to ensure the effectiveness of fielded equipment.
- **Progress** – In 2008, the Army fielded more than one million items of equipment including over 7,000 Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles, providing Soldiers fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan the best equipment available.

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Process

- **Goal** – Improve the ARFORGEN process to generate trained, ready, and cohesive units for combatant commanders on a rotational basis to meet current and future strategic demands. Achieve a degree of balance by reaching a ratio of one year deployed to two years at home station for Active Component units, and one year deployed to four years at home for Reserve Component units by 2011.
- **Progress** – Recent refinements in the ARFORGEN process have increased predictability for Soldiers and their Families. When combined with the announced drawdown in Iraq, this will substantially increase the time our Soldiers have at home.

Reset

In order to prepare Soldiers, their Families, and units for future deployments and contingencies, we must reset the force to rebuild the readiness that has been consumed in operations. Reset restores deployed units to a level of personnel and equipment readiness necessary for future missions. The Army is using a standard reset model and is continuing a reset pilot program to further improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the ARFORGEN process. To reset our force, we are revitalizing Soldiers and Families; repairing, replacing, and recapitalizing equipment; and retraining Soldiers.

Revitalize Soldiers and Families

- **Goal** – Increase the time our Soldiers and Families have together to reestablish and strengthen relationships following deployments.
- **Progress** – In the reset pilot program, units have no readiness requirements or Army-directed training during the reset period (6 months for the Active Component and 12 months for the Reserve Components). This period allows units to focus on Soldier professional and personal education, property accountability, and equipment maintenance, and also provides quality time for Soldiers and their Families.

Repair, Replace, and Recapitalize Equipment

- **Goal** – Fully implement an Army-wide program that replaces equipment that has been destroyed in combat and repairs or recapitalizes equipment that has been rapidly worn out due to harsh conditions and excessive use. As units return, the Army will reset equipment during the same reconstitution period we dedicate to Soldier and Family reintegration.
- **Progress** – The Army reset more than 125,000 pieces of equipment in 2008. The maintenance activities and capacity at Army depots increased to their highest levels in the past 35 years.

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Retrain Soldiers, Leaders, and Units

- Goal – Provide our Soldiers with the critical specialty training and professional military education necessary to accomplish the full spectrum of missions required in today's strategic environment.
- Progress – The Army is executing a Training and Leader Development Strategy to prepare Soldiers and units for full spectrum operations. The Army is 60 percent complete in efforts to rebalance job skills required to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.

Reset Pilot Program

- Goal – Provide lessons learned that identify institutional improvements that standardize the reset process for both the Active and Reserve Components and determine timing, scope, and resource implications.
- Progress – In 2008, the Army initiated a six-month pilot reset program for 13 units (8 Active Component and 5 Reserve Components). The Army has learned many significant lessons and is applying them to all redeploying units to allow units more time to accomplish reset objectives at their home stations.

Transform

We must transform our force to provide the combatant commanders dominant, strategically responsive forces capable of meeting diverse challenges across the entire spectrum of 21st Century conflict. To transform our force, we are adopting modular organizations, accelerating delivery of advanced technologies, operationalizing the Reserve Components, restationing our forces, and transforming leader development.

Modular Reorganization

- Goal – Reorganize the Active and Reserve Components into standardized modular organizations, thereby increasing the number of BCTs and support brigades to meet operational requirements and creating a more deployable, adaptable, and versatile force.

- Progress – In addition to the 32 newly activated modular brigades, the Army converted 14 brigades from a legacy structure to a modular structure in 2008 (5 Active Component and 9 Reserve Component Brigades). The Army has transformed 83 percent of our units to modular formations—the largest organizational change since World War II.

Advanced Technologies

- Goal – Modernize and transform the Army to remain a globally responsive force and ensure our Soldiers retain their technological edge for the current and future fights.
- Progress – The Army will accelerate delivery of advanced technologies to Infantry BCTs fighting in combat today through "Spin-outs" from our Future Combat Systems program. This aggressive fielding schedule, coupled with a tailored test and evaluation strategy, ensures Soldiers receive reliable, proven equipment that will give them a decisive advantage over any enemy.

Operationalize the Reserve Components

- Goal – Complete the transformation of the Reserve Components to an operational force by changing the way we train, equip, resource, and mobilize Reserve Component units by 2012.
- Progress – The Army continued efforts to systematically build and sustain readiness and to increase predictability of deployments for Soldiers, their Families, employers, and communities by integrating the ARFORGEN process.

Restationing Forces

- Goal – Restation forces and families around the globe based on the Department of Defense's (DoD) Global Defense Posture and Realignment initiatives, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) statutes, and the expansion of the Army directed by the President in January 2007.
- Progress – To date, in support of BRAC, our Army has obligated 95 percent of the \$8.5

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Billion received. Of more than 300 major construction projects in the BRAC program, 9 have been completed and another 139 awarded. The Army has also completed 77 National Environmental Policy Act actions, closed 1 active installation and 15 U.S. Army Reserve Centers, terminated 9 leases, and turned over 1,133 excess acres from BRAC 2005 properties. The Army is on track to complete BRAC by 2011.

Soldier and Leader Development

- **Goal** – Develop agile and adaptive military and Civilian leaders who can operate effectively in Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments.
- **Progress** – The Army published Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, which includes a new operational concept for full spectrum operations where commanders simultaneously apply offensive, defensive, and stability operations to achieve decisive results. Additionally, the Army published FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* and FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* and is finalizing FM 4-0, *Sustainment*. The doctrine reflected in these new manuals provides concepts and principles that will develop adaptive leaders to train and sustain our Soldiers in an era of persistent conflict.

Setting Conditions for the Future: Six Essential Qualities of Our Army

In an era of persistent conflict, our Army is the primary enabling and integrating element of landpower. The Army's transformation focuses on distinct qualities that land forces must possess to succeed in the evolving security environment. In order to face the security challenges ahead, the Army will continue to transform into a land force that is versatile, expeditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable, and interoperable.

Versatile forces are multipurpose and can accomplish a broad range of tasks, moving easily across the spectrum of conflict as the situation demands. Our versatility in military operations—made possible by full spectrum training, adaptable

equipment, and scalable force packages—will enable us to defeat a wide range of unpredictable threats.

Our Army must remain an **expeditionary** force—organized, trained, and equipped to go anywhere in the world on short notice, against any adversary, to accomplish the assigned mission, including the ability to conduct forcible entry operations in remote, non-permissive environments. Working in concert with our force projection partners, the United States Transportation Command and sister services, we will enhance our expeditionary force projection and distribution capability to provide rapid, credible, and sustainable global response options for the Joint Force.

Agile forces adapt quickly to exploit opportunities in complex environments. Our Army is developing agile Soldiers and institutions that adapt and work effectively in such environments.

A core competency of land forces is to effectively, efficiently, and appropriately apply **lethal** force. The lethal nature of our forces enables our ability to deter, dissuade, and, when required, defeat our enemies. Because conflicts will increasingly take place among the people, the Army will continue to pursue technological and intelligence capabilities to provide lethal force with precision to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage.

Our Army must be organized, trained, and equipped to ensure it is capable of **sustainable** operations for as long as necessary to achieve national objectives. In addition, we will continue to improve our ability to guarantee the logistical capacity to conduct long-term operations while presenting a minimal footprint to reduce exposure of support forces.

The extensive planning and organizing capabilities and experience of U.S. land forces are national assets. These capabilities are essential to preparing and assisting interagency, multinational, and host nation partners to execute their roles in conflict prevention and resolution. Our force needs to be increasingly **interoperable** to effectively support and integrate the efforts of Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and indigenous elements to achieve national goals.

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As we look to the future, our Army is modernizing and transforming to build a force that exhibits these six essential qualities in order to meet the challenges of the security environment of the 21st Century. The Army's adoption of a modular, scalable brigade-based organization provides a broad range of capabilities that are inherently more versatile, adaptable, and able to conduct operations over extended periods.

Another critical transformation initiative to enhance the Army's capabilities is the modernization of our global information network capabilities through integration of the Global Network Enterprise Construct (GNEC). The GNEC will enable network war-fighting capabilities, dramatically improve and protect the LandWarNet, improve both efficiency and effectiveness of the network, and ensure Army interoperability across DoD.

As part of our transformation, the Army is adapting as an institution principally in three areas: streamlining the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process, implementing an enterprise approach, and establishing a more effective requirements process. A streamlined ARFORGEN process more efficiently mans, equips, and trains units to strengthen our expeditionary capability. The enterprise approach—a holistic method to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Army's policies and processes—will make our institutions more efficient and more responsive to the needs of the combatant commanders. An improved requirements process will provide more timely and flexible responses to meet the needs of our Soldiers. In transforming our training and leader development model, we produce more agile Soldiers and Civilians who are capable of operating in complex and volatile environments.

The Army's modernization efforts are specifically designed to enhance these six essential land force qualities by empowering Soldiers with the decisive advantage across the continuum of full spectrum operations. Modernization is providing our Soldiers and leaders with leading-edge technology and capabilities to fight the wars we are in today while simultaneously preparing for future complex, dynamic threats. The Army is improving capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; information sharing; and Soldier protection to give our Soldiers an unparalleled awareness of their

operational environment, increased precision and lethality, and enhanced survivability.

The Army also is addressing the capability gaps in our current force by accelerating delivery of advanced technologies to Soldiers in Infantry BCTs. For example, more than 5,000 robots are currently in Iraq and Afghanistan, including an early version of the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV). Soldiers are using the SUGV prototype to clear caves and bunkers, search buildings, and defuse improvised explosive devices. In addition, an early version of the Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is currently supporting Soldiers in Iraq with reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. The Class I UAV operates in open, rolling, complex, and urban terrain and can take off and land vertically without a runway. It is part of the information network, providing real time information that increases Soldier agility and lethality while enhancing Soldier protection.

Overall, Army modernization efforts provide a technological edge for our Soldiers in today's fight and are essential to the Army's efforts to empower Soldiers with the land force qualities needed in the 21st Century.

Stewardship/Innovations

The Nation's Army remains committed to being the best possible steward of the resources provided by the American people through the Congress. We continue to develop and implement initiatives designed to conserve resources and to reduce waste and inefficiencies wherever possible.

The recent establishment of two organizations highlights the Army's commitment to improving efficiencies. In 2008, the Secretary of the Army established the Senior Energy Council to develop an Army Enterprise Energy Security Strategy. The Senior Energy Council is implementing a plan that reduces energy consumption and utilizes innovative technologies for alternative and renewable energy, including harvesting wind, solar and geothermal energy, while leveraging energy partnerships with private sector expertise. The Army is replacing 4,000 petroleum-fueled vehicles with electric vehicles. We also are underway in our six-year biomass waste-to-fuel technology demonstrations at six of our installations.

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As part of the Army's efforts in adapting institutions, we also established the Enterprise Task Force to optimize the ARFORGEN process for effectively and efficiently delivering trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders.

In addition, in order to increase logistical efficiencies and readiness, the Army is developing 360 Degree Logistics Readiness—an initiative that proactively synchronizes logistics support capability and unit readiness. This new approach will allow the Army to see, assess, and synchronize enterprise assets in support of our operational forces. The 360 Degree Logistics Readiness bridges the information system gaps between selected legacy logistics automation systems and the Single Army Logistics Enterprise. It will improve visibility, accountability, fidelity, and timeliness of information to facilitate better decisions at every managerial level.

Finally, the Army is committed to reforming our acquisition, procurement, and contracting processes

to more efficiently and responsively meet the needs of our Soldiers. A streamlined requirements process based on reasonable requirements with adequately mature technology will produce a system with greater urgency and agility and guard against "requirements creep." The Army also will continue to grow its acquisition workforce and provide disciplined oversight to its acquisition programs.

Accomplishments

The Army has been fully engaged over the past year. We remain focused on prevailing in Iraq and Afghanistan, while concurrently working to restore balance and transforming to set the conditions for success in the future. Despite the high global operational tempo and our continuing efforts to restore balance and prepare for future contingencies, we have accomplished much in the last year:

Army Accomplishments

- Manned, trained, equipped, and deployed 15 combat brigades, 34 support brigades, and 369 military and police transition teams in support of Iraq and Afghanistan
- Deployed more than 293,000 Soldiers into or out of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan
- Repaired more than 100,000 pieces of Army equipment through the efforts at the Army's depot facilities
- Invested in the psychological health of the Army by investing over \$500 Million in additional psychological health providers, new facilities, and world-class research
- Reduced the on-duty Soldier accident rate by 46 percent in 2008 through Soldier and leader emphasis on Army safety measures
- Reduced the Army's ground accidents by 50 percent and the Army's major aviation accidents by 38 percent in 2008 through leader application of the Army's Composite Risk Management model
- Implemented Family Covenants throughout the Army and committed more than \$1.5 Billion to Army Family programs and services
- Improved on-post housing by privatizing more than 80,000 homes, building 17,000 homes, and renovating 13,000 homes since 2000 at 39 different installations through the Residential Communities Initiative
- Reduced energy consumption in Army facilities by 10.4 percent since 2003 through the implementation of the Army's energy strategy
- Won six Shingo Public Sector Awards for implementing best business practices
- Destroyed more than 2,100 tons of chemical agents, disposed of 70,000 tons of obsolete or unserviceable conventional ammunition, and removed 163,000 missiles or missile components from the Army's arsenal
- Fostered partnerships with allies by training more than 10,000 foreign students in stateside Army schools and by executing over \$14.5 Billion in new foreign military sales to include \$6.2 Billion in support of Iraq and Afghanistan
- Saved \$41 Million by in-sourcing more than 900 core governmental functions to Army Civilians
- Improved Soldier quality of life by constructing or modernizing 29,000 barracks spaces

2009 ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT**America's Army—The Strength of the Nation**

The Army's All-Volunteer Force is a national treasure. Less than one percent of Americans wear the uniform of our Nation's military; they and their Families carry the lion's share of the burden of a Nation at war. Despite these burdens, our Soldiers continue to perform magnificently across the globe and at home, and their Families remain steadfast in their support. Our Civilians remain equally dedicated to the Army's current and long-term success. They all deserve the best the Nation has to offer.

America's Army has always served the Nation by defending its national interests and providing support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies. Seven years of combat have taken a great toll on the Army, our Soldiers, and their Families. To meet the continuing challenges of an era of persistent conflict, our Army must restore balance and set the conditions for the future while sustaining our All-Volunteer Force. We must ensure our Soldiers have the best training, equipment, and leadership we can provide them. Our Army has made significant progress over the last year, but has several tough years ahead. With the support of Congress, the Army will continue to protect America's national security interests while we transform ourselves to meet the challenges of today and the future. **America's Army—The Strength of the Nation.**

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ADDENDUM A – Information Papers

360 Degree Logistics Readiness	Army Preparatory School
Accelerate Army Growth	Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS)
Active Component Reserve Component (ACRC) Rebalance	Army Reserve Employer Relations (ARER) Program
Adaptive Logistics	Army Reserve Voluntary Education Services
Add-on Armor for Tactical Wheeled Vehicles	Army Reserve Voluntary Selective Continuation
Africa Command (AFRICOM)	Army Spouse Employment Partnership (ASEP) Program
Armed Forces Recreation Centers	Army Strong
Army Asymmetric Warfare Office (AAWO)	Army Suicide Prevention Program (ASPP)
Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP)	Army Values
Army Career Tracker (ACT) Program	Army Volunteer Program
Army Civilian University (ACU)	ARNG Active First Program
Army Community Service (ACS) Family Programs	ARNG Agribusiness Development Team
Army Community Service (ACS) Family Readiness Programs	ARNG Community Based Warrior Transition Units
Army Energy Plan (AEP)	ARNG Critical Skills Retention Bonus
Army Environmental Programs	ARNG Education Support Center
Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF)	ARNG Environmental Programs
Army Family Action Plan (AFAP)	ARNG Every Soldier a Recruiter
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)	ARNG Exportable Combat Training Capability
Army Geospatial Enterprise (AGE)	ARNG Family Assistance Centers
Army Integrated Logistics Architecture (AILA)	ARNG Freedom Salute Campaign
Army Leader Development Program (ALDP)	ARNG GED Plus Program
Army Modernization Strategy	ARNG Muscatatuck Army Urban Training Center
Army Onesource	ARNG Operational Support Airlift Agency
Army Physical Fitness Research Institute	ARNG Periodic Health Assessment (PHA)
Army Physical Readiness Training (FM 3-22.02)	ARNG Post Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA)

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ARNG Recruit Sustainment Program	College of the American Soldier
ARNG Recruiting Assistance Program (G-RAP)	Combat Casualty Care
ARNG Strong Bonds	Combat Training Center (CTC) Program
ARNG Western Army Aviation Training Site (WAATS)	Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Asymmetric Warfare Group	Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD)
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Program	Common Levels of Support
Basic and Advanced NCO Courses	Common Logistics Operating Environment (CLOE)
Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC)	Community Covenant
Behavioral Health	Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program
Better Opportunity for Single Soldiers (BOSS)	Concept Development and Experimentation
Biometrics	Condition-Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+)
Broad Career Groups	Construction and Demolition Recycling Program
Building Partnership Capacity Through Security Cooperation	Continuum of Service
Campaign Capable Force	Contractor-Acquired Government Owned (CAGO) Equipment
Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT)	Cultural and Foreign Language Capabilities
Career Intern Fellows Program	Cyber Operations
CBRNE Consequence Management Reaction Force (CCMRF)	Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS)
CENTCOM Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program	Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)
Changing the Culture	Defense Support to Civil Authorities - Defense Coordinating Officer
Chemical Demilitarization Program	Defense Support to Civil Authorities - Special Events
Child and Youth Services School Support	Deployment Cycle Support
Child Care Program	Depot Maintenance Initiatives
Civil Works	Digital Training Management System (DTMS)
Civilian Corps Creed	Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A)
Civilian Education System	Diversity

		2009 ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT
ADDENDUM A – Information Papers		

Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX)	General Fund Enterprise Business System
Enhanced Use Leasing	Generating Force Support for Operations
Enlistment Incentives	Global Force Posture
Enlistment Incentives Program Enhancements	Global Network Enterprise Construct (GNEC)
Equal Opportunity and Prevention of Sexual Harassment (EO/POSH)	Helicopter, Black Hawk Utility Helicopter (UH-60)
Equipment Reset	Helicopter, Chinook Heavy Lift Helicopter (CH-47)
Equipping Enterprise and Reuse Conference	Helicopter, Lakota (UH-72)
Equipping the Reserve Components	Helicopter, Longbow Apache (AH-64D)
Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP)	Human Terrain System (HTS)
Expanding Intelligence Training	HUMINT: Growing Army Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Capabilities
Expeditionary Basing	Information Doctrine
Expeditionary Capabilities	In-Sourcing
Expeditionary Contracting	Installation Planning Board
Expeditionary Theater Opening	Institutional Adaptation
Family Advocacy Program (FAP)	Institutional Training Under Centers of Excellence (COE)
Family Covenant	Intelligence Transformation
Family Housing Program	Interceptor Body Armor (IBA)
Foreign Military Sales	Interpreter/Translator Program
FORSCOM Mission Support Elements (MSE)	Irregular Warfare Capabilities
Freedom Team Salute	Joint Basing
Freedrop Packaging Concept Project (FPCP)	Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capstone Program (JKDDC)
Full Replacement Value (FRV) and Defense Property System (DPS)	Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS)
Full Spectrum Operations in Army Capstone Doctrine (FM 3-0)	Leader Development Assessment Course - Warrior Forge
Funds Control Module	Lean Six Sigma: Continuous Process Improvement Initiative
Future Force Integration Directorate	

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ADDENDUM A – Information Papers

Lean Six Sigma: G-4 Initiative	National Guard Yellow Ribbon Program
Life Cycle Management Initiative	National Guard Youth ChalleNGe
Live, Virtual, Constructive Integrated Training Environment	National Security Personnel System (NSPS)
Manpower Personnel Integration Program (MANPRINT)	Next Generation Wireless Communications (NGWC)
March 2 Success	Officer Education System (OES)
Medical and Dental Readiness	Officer Education System - Warrant Officers
Military Construction (MILCON) Program	Officer Retention
Military Construction (MILCON) Transformation	Pandemic Influenza Preparation
Military Family Life Consultants (MFLC) Program	Partnership for Youth Success Programs (PaYS)
Military Intelligence Capacity	Persistent Air and Ground Surveillance to Counter IED
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles	Persistent Conflict
Mobile Training Teams (MTT) for Warrior Leader Course (WLC)	Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES)
Mobilization Tiger Team	Post Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA)
Modular Force Conversion	Power Projection Platform
Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR)	Privatization of Army Lodging
Multinational Exercises	Property Accountability
Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) Program	Rapid Equipping Force (REF)
National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)	Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI)
National Guard Counterdrug Program	Real-Estate Disposal
National Guard Public Affairs Rapid Response Team (PARRT)	Red Team Education and Training
National Guard State Partnership Program	Redeployment Process Improvements
National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs)	Referral Bonus Pilot Program
	Reset
	Residential Communities Initiative (RCI)
	Restructuring Army Aviation
	Retained Issue OCIE
	Retention Program

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ADDENDUM A – Information Papers	
Retiree Pre-Tax Healthcare	Transferability of GI Bill Benefits to Family Members
Retirement Services	Transforming the Reserve Components to an Operational Force
Retrograde	Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)
Risk Management	Unaccompanied Personnel Housing
Robotics	Unit Combined Arms Training Strategies
Safety and Occupational Training	Unmanned Aircraft, Raven Small System
Safety Center Online Tools and Initiatives	Unmanned Aircraft, Shadow System
Science and Technology	Unmanned Aircraft, Sky Warrior System
Sexual Harassment / Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program	Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
Single Army Logistics Enterprise (SALE)	War Reserve Secondary Items
Soldier and Family Action Plan (SFAP)	Warfighter's Forums (WfF)
Soldier and Family Assistance Center Program and Warrior in Transition Units	Warrior Ethos
Soldier as a System	Warrior in Transition
Soldier's Creed	Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills
Stability Operations (FM 3-07)	Warrior University
Strong Bonds	Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)
Structured Self Development	Wounded Warrior Program
Survivor Outreach Services	Youth Programs
Sustainability	
Sustainable Range Program	
The Army Distributed Learning Program (TADLP)	
The Human Dimension: The Concept and Capabilities Development	
Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (TCOIC)	
Training for Full Spectrum Operations (FM 7-0)	
Training Support System (TSS)	

2009 ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT

ADDENDUM B – Websites

Headquarters, Department of the Army and other Commands

This site has links for information regarding the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Command Structure, Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), and Direct Reporting Units (DRU).
<http://www.army.mil/institution/organization/>

The Army Homepage

This site is the most visited military website in the world, averaging about seven million visitors per month or approximately 250 hits per second. It provides news, features, imagery, and references.
<http://www.army.mil/>

The Army Modernization Strategy

http://www.g8.army.mil/G8site_redesign/modStrat.htm

The Army Posture Statement

This site provides access to archived Army Posture Statements from 1997 to 2008.
<http://www.army.mil/aps>

The Army Staff

Personnel: G-1
<http://www.armyg1.army.mil/>

Intelligence: G-2

<http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/>

Operations, Plans, and Policy: G-3/5/7

<https://www.g357extranet.army.pentagon.mil>

Logistics: G-4

<http://www.hqda.army.mil/logweb/>

Programs: G-8

This site provides information on material integration and management.
<http://www.army.mil/institution/organization/unitsa ndcommands/dcs/g-8/>

Installation Management

This site provides information about policy formulation, strategy development, enterprise integration, program analysis and integration, requirements and resource determination,

and best business practices for services, programs, and installation support to Soldiers, their Families, and Army Civilians.

<http://www.acsim.army.mil/>

Army Commands (ACOMs)**Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)**

<http://www.forscom.army.mil/>

Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

<http://www.tradoc.army.mil/>

Army Materiel Command (AMC)

<http://www.army.mil/institution/organization/unitsa ndcommands/commandstructure/amc/>

Reserve Components**Army Reserve**

<http://www.armyreserve.army.mil>

Army National Guard

<http://www.armg.army.mil>

Other informative websites**Army Wounded Warrior Program**

This site provides information on the Army's Wounded Warrior Program which provides support to severely wounded Soldiers and their Families.

<https://www.aw2.army.mil>

My ArmyLifeToo Web Portal

This site serves as an entry point to the Army Integrated Family Network and Army OneSource.
<http://www.myarmylifetoo.com>

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ADDENDUM C – Acronyms

AC	Active Component	COTS	Commercial Off-The-Shelf
ACOM	Army Command	CS	Combat Support
ACP	Army Campaign Plan	CSS	Combat Service Support
AETF	Army Evaluation Task Force	CT	Counter Terrorism
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation	CTC	Combat Training Center
AFRICOM	Africa Command		
AMAP	Army Medical Action Plan	DA	Department of the Army
AMC	Army Material Command	DA PAM	Department of the Army Pamphlet
APS	Army Prepositioned Stocks	DCGS-A	Distributed Common Ground
AR	Army Regulation		System-Army
ARCIC	Army Capabilities Integration Center	DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
ARNG	Army National Guard	DMETL	Directed Mission Essential Task List
ASC	Army Sustainment Command	DoD	Department of Defense
ASCC	Army Service Component Command	DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities
AWG	Asymmetric Warfare Group		
AWO	Asymmetric Warfare Office	EBCT	Evaluation Brigade Combat Team
AW2	Army Wounded Warrior Program	EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
		ES2	Every Soldier a Sensor
BCT	Brigade Combat Team	ETF	Enterprise Task Force
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program		
BOLC	Basic Officer Leader Course	FCS	Future Combat Systems
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure	FM	Field Manual
		FORSCOM	Forces Command
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear	FY	Fiscal Year
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and (High-Yield) Explosives	GBIAD	Global Based Integrated Air Defense
CCDR	Combatant Commander	GCSS-A	Global Combat Service Support-Army
CCMRP	CBRNE Consequence Management Reaction Force	GDPR	Global Defense Posture Realignment
CES	Civilian Education System	GNEC	Global Network Enterprise Construct
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	HBCT	Heavy Brigade Combat Team
		HMMWV	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
CMETL	Core Mission Essential Task List	HUMINT	Human Intelligence
CMTC	Combat Maneuver Training Center		
COCOM	Combatant Command	IBA	Improved Body Armor
COE	Center of Excellence; Common Operating Environment; Contemporary Operating Environment	IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
		IED	Improvised Explosive Device
COIN	Counterinsurgency	ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
		IT	Information Technology

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ADDENDUM C – Acronyms

JIEDDO	Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization	QOL	Quality of Life
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational	RC	Reserve Components
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center	RCI	Residential Communities Initiative
JTF	Joint Task Force	REF	Rapid Equipping Force
LMP	Logistics Modernization Program	RFI	Rapid Fielding Initiative
LSS	Lean Six Sigma	SALE	Single Army Logistics Enterprise
MI	Military Intelligence	SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
METL	Mission Essential Task List	SFAP	Soldier and Family Action Plan
MOUT	Military Operations in Urban Terrain	SHARP	Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program
MRAP	Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected	SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
MRE	Mission Readiness Exercise	SOF	Special Operations Forces
MRX	Mission Rehearsal Exercise	SOS	Survivor Outreach Services
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment		
MTT	Mobile Training Teams	TBI	Traumatic Brain Injury
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical	TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
NEPA	National Environmental Protection Act	TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
NET	New Equipment Training	TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer	UAH	Up-Armored HMMWV
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act	UAS	Unmanned Aircraft System
NDS	National Defense Strategy	UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
NLOS-C	Non Line of Sight-Cannon	UGV	Unmanned Ground Vehicle
NMS	National Military Strategy	USAR	United States Army Reserve
NSPS	National Security Personnel System		
NSS	National Security Strategy	VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
NTC	National Training Center		
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations	WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom	WO	Warrant Officer
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom	WTBD	Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo	WTU	Warrior Transition Units
O&M	Operations and Maintenance		
POM	Program Objective Memorandum		
PSYOP	Psychological Operations		
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder		
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review		

Addendum D: Reserve Component Readiness Data

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 1994 require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this addendum as ANGCRRA). Section 521 reporting was later amended by Section 704 of NDAA 1996. The U.S. Army Reserve Information is also presented using Section 521 reporting criteria.

Section 517(b)(2)(A). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as Active Component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

	AC in RC*	Army Average **
FY07		
Major	100% (6 of 6)	94.9%
Lieutenant Colonel	100% (2 of 2)	91.0%
FY08		
Major	0% (0 of 1)	92.8%
Lieutenant Colonel	100% (1 of 1)	89.1%

*Active Component (AC) officers serving in Reserve Component (RC) assignments at time of consideration.

**Active Component officers not serving in Reserve Component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 517(b)(2)(B). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as Active Component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

	AC in RC*	Army Average **
FY07		
Major	50% (1 of 2)	9.0%
Lieutenant Colonel	0% (0 of 1)	9.7%
FY08		
Major	0% (0 of 4)	4.9%
Lieutenant Colonel	0% (0 of 0)	13.5%

*Below the zone Active Component officers serving in Reserve Component assignments at time of consideration.

**Below-the-zone Active Component officers not serving in Reserve Component assignments at time of consideration.

Section 521(b).

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the ARNG or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG officers: 14,659 or 37.8 percent

Army Reserve officers: 18,116 or 54.6 percent

Addendum D: Reserve Component Readiness Data

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the ARNG or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG enlisted: 91,853 or 28.6 percent

Army Reserve enlisted: 57,391 or 35.6 percent

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to Section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY08, no graduates of a service academy were released to the Selected Reserve to complete their obligation.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under Section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY08, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to Section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY08, no distinguished ROTC graduates were released before completing an active-duty service obligation.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under Section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY08 no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the ROTC program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with Section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (a) two years of active duty, and (b) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the ARNG and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:

In FY08, one ROTC graduate was released early from their active-duty obligation. This officer is completing the remaining obligation through service in the ARNG.

Addendum D: Reserve Component Readiness Data

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under Section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in Section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with Army Reserve data also reported).

In FY08, 2,170 ARNG officers from units were recommended for position-vacancy promotion and promoted. This number consists of 296 U.S. Army Medical Department, 1,845 Army Promotion List and 29 Chaplains.

In FY08, 43 Army Reserve officers from units were recommended for position-vacancy promotion and promoted.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under Section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for non-commissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

In FY08, the ARNG had a total of 559 Noncommissioned Officers receive a military education waiver. As of September 30, 2008 those waiver recipients were eligible for promotion to the next rank, but have not obtained the military education requirement that was previously waived.

In FY08, the Army Reserve had a total of 375 receive a military education waiver.

The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the waivers referred to in Section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA to the Director, ARNG and to the Commander, U.S. Army Reserve Command. A majority of these waivers were approved due to the Soldiers being deployed and/or performing operational missions. Headquarters, National Guard Bureau and U.S. Army Reserve Command maintain the details for each waiver.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under Section 1115 of ANGCRRA for members of the ARNG who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (A narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve is also provided.)

In FY08, 67,623 ARNG Soldiers were considered nondeployable because of incomplete initial entry training, officer transition, medical issues, nonparticipation, or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under Public Law 104-208, 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) §922 (g)(9) (an amendment to the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 - Lautenberg Amendment). The National Guard Bureau maintains the detailed information.

In FY08, 36,974 Army Reserve Soldiers were considered nondeployable because of incomplete initial entry training, officer transition, medical issues, nonparticipation, or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment. The Army Reserve maintains the detailed information.

9. The number of members of the ARNG, shown for each State, that were

Addendum D: Reserve Component Readiness Data

discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to Section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the ARNG. (Army Reserve data also reported.)

The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during FY08 for not completing minimum training requirements for deployment was 167 officers and 12,866 enlisted Soldiers from all U.S. states and territories. The breakdown by each State is maintained by the National Guard Bureau.

The number of Army Reserve Soldiers discharged during FY08 for not completing minimum training requirements for deployment was 42 officers and 295 enlisted Soldiers.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under Section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in Section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

In FY08 the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers to ARNG or Army Reserve Soldiers.

11. The number of ARNG members, shown for each State, (and the number of Army Reserve members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to Section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

a. The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

In FY08, 215,792 ARNG Soldiers underwent a screening. Of these personnel, 14,700 or 6.8 percent were identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In FY08, 65,209 Army Reserve Soldiers underwent a screening. Of these personnel 3,572 or 5.4 percent were identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

b. The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to Section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

In FY08, 10,536 ARNG Soldiers were transferred from deployable to nondeployable status for failing to meet medical deployability standards. This number includes Soldiers returning from a mobilization with a new medical condition and reflects an increase in the use of electronic databases.

In FY08, 9,128 Army Reserve Soldiers were transferred from deployable to nondeployable for failing to meet medical deployability standards. Many of the 9,128 Soldiers considered non deployable for failing to meet medical deployability standards in FY08 are carry-overs from a previous fiscal year due to temporary medical conditions.

Addendum D: Reserve Component Readiness Data

12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of the ARNG shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

13. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the ARNG shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

14. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the ARNG shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

15. The number of units of the ARNG that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each ARNG combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for ARNG combat units (and Army Reserve units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of Section 1119 of ANGCRRA.

Information on the type of training required by units during post-mobilization is maintained by First United States Army. The states do not capture or provide this data.

In 2008, Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) led a comprehensive review of lessons learned from pre and post-mobilization preparation. The review initially focused on the five ARNG Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) (known as the 4+1 Comprehensive Review). Those Brigades are the 27th from New York, 37th from Ohio/Michigan, 39th from Arkansas, 45th from Oklahoma, and 76th from Indiana. The review produced key findings for improving the mobilization process and delivering combat ready Soldiers and units to combatant commanders on time.

From this review, we learned that effectively linking pre- and post-mobilization training and minimizing post-mobilization training requires early identification of the mission, organization, and mission essential equipment to build an effective deployment plan. Early manning and stabilization of the Deployment Expeditionary Force unit is necessary for efficient use of training time and building a cohesive force. Predictability in pre-mob provides predictability in post-mob, and an extended training period, close to, or contiguous with mobilization station arrival, enables the commander to attain the highest levels of readiness and unit capability. These lessons, coupled with the 12 month mobilization policy, confirm the value of collaboratively developing a synchronized, pre-deployment training plan spanning both pre- and post-mobilization, allowing

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commanders to develop a period of intense, mission-focused, homestation training conducted contiguous with mobilization, if required.

The amount of post-mobilization training time is dependent upon the size and type of the unit which is mobilizing, as well as its assigned mission. The minimum planning time for post-mobilization is 15 days to accomplish administrative tasks and required training. Based on mission requirements, readiness of the unit, and the original unit Modification Table of Organization and Equipment, the number of training days can extend to 60 days (or beyond) to complete required collective training for larger units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. A result from the 4+1 Comprehensive Review was the development of four deployment training models for different categories of mobilizing units: Category 1 – Base Camp Units (i.e., functional and sustainment units); Category 2 – Base Camp Units with Travel Off Base Camp (i.e., Civil Affairs, Engineer units, Truck Companies, Combat Support Hospitals); Category 3 – Conduct Mission Off Base Camp (i.e., Provisional Reconstruction Teams, Security Forces, Military Police, Military Intelligence, Aviation); Category 4 – Maneuver Units with an Area of Operations, new units, constrained timeline (i.e., counterinsurgency Brigade Combat Teams, Aviation Brigades).

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year (FY08 only) to comply with the requirement in Section 1120 of ANGCRRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the ARNG (and the Army Reserve).

During FY08, the ARNG continued to synchronize the requirements of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) training model with live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators (TADSS). Some of the ARNG's most significant uses of TADSS devices included:

- The ARNG continued the fielding of the Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer, the Tabletop Full-fidelity Trainers, and the Conduct of Fire Trainer XXI for M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank and M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to the Abrams Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer XXI, will be the primary simulation trainers to meet the virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2 crews.
- The Close-Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT), the Rehosted Simulations Network (SIMNET) XXI, and the Rehosted SIMNET CCTT Core provide a mobile training capability to our dispersed heavy (armor) units.
- The Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer provides commanders a unique and critical mission rehearsal tool to train ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations.
- The Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000), currently being fielded to the ARNG, is the Army's approved marksmanship-training device. The ARNG is also continuing use of its previously procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) until EST 2000 fielding is complete. The EST 2000 and FATS also provide unit collective tactical training for dismounted Infantry, Special Operations Forces, Scouts, Engineer, and Military Police squads, and combat support and combat service support elements. These systems also support units conducting vital homeland defense missions.
- The Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS) supplements ARNG marksmanship-training. The LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier's weapon without live ammunition. It is utilized for developing and sustaining marksmanship

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skills, diagnosing and correcting marksmanship problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills.

- The Call for Fire Trainer, currently being fielded to the ARNG, assists units to meet the pre-mobilization training requirement for all Soldiers to become familiar with the TTPs to call for indirect fire support.

The ARNG's Battle Command Training Capability Program (BCTCP) continues providing support for digital systems training and battle staff digital systems integration training and battle staff proficiency. The BCTCP has three designated Battle Command Training Centers (BCTC); at Fort Leavenworth, KS; Camp Dodge, IA; and Fort Indiantown Gap, PA; and the Distributed Battle Simulation Program (DBSP). The BCTCs provide the backbone of the program as collective hubs in the battle command training strategy. The DBSP provides Commanders assistance from Commander's Operational Training Assistants, TADSS facilitators, and Technical Support Teams. The BCTCs and the DBSP collectively help units in the planning, preparation, and execution of simulations-based battle staff training that augments the Department of the Army-directed Warfighter Exercises and greatly enhances battle staff and unit proficiency.

The ARNG continues to execute the Exportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) which is the critical culminating company level training event. The XCTC program is a theater immersion collective training event of combined arms training in the contemporary operating environment. It incorporates current TTPs and theater-specific lessons learned for units conducting pre-mobilization training in preparation for deployment. The XCTC provides a method to certify ARNG units on company-level collective training tasks and demonstrated battle staff proficiency prior to mobilization. The XCTC incorporates the use of advanced live, virtual, and constructive training technologies (Deployable Force-on-Force Instrumented Range System that allow for full instrumentation of the training area, individual Soldiers, role players, civilians on the battlefield, and opposing forces. By full instrumentation of the units, Soldiers, and training areas, units receive an After-Action Review (AAR) complete with two-dimensional, three-dimensional, and video playback of the actual XCTC training exercise. This AAR allows Commanders and Soldiers to see what occurred during the training exercise from every perspective, which further enhances the training experience.

In FY07 the Army Reserve efforts centered on acquiring the major Live-Virtual-Constructive enablers needed to conduct major collective events (e.g., Warrior Exercises, Battle Command, Combat Support Training Centers) planned for years three and four of the ARFORGEN process. In FY08, the effort expanded to include the TADSS support for the reserve center portion of "home station" training.

The Army Reserve initiated an effort to create "capabilities based" reserve centers to support full spectrum operations individual-crew-squad-team training requirements. Under this initiative, reserve centers would have Digital Training Facilities and Weapon Simulator Training Rooms. In FY08, the Army Reserve established 53 digital training facility locations and 3 weapons simulator training rooms. These locations do not currently have all of the enablers necessary to support training activities. The capabilities based reserve centers include a plan to provide an array of the following enablers depending upon the training needs of the local unit populations:

- LMTS

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- EST 2000
- Virtual Simulators
- Multi-user classrooms w/Computers (Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network-Army Reserve Network, Training Local Area Network, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Distance Learning capable)
- Language Lab

The Army Reserve obtained the licenses for DARWARS to be used for training in digital training facilities during FY08. DARWARS delivers both "off-the shelf" experiential training packages as well as comprehensive enterprise solutions that focus on the needs of a particular organization. These systems offer immersive practice environments to individuals and teams, with on-target feedback for each trainee. DARWARS provides advanced infrastructure and tools which delivers engaging training to increase readiness.

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by Section 1121 of ANGCRRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information:

Readiness tables are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3 and is not captured by State.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with Section 1121:

Summary tables and overall assessments are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3 and is not captured by State.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

a. The number of such inspections;

b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

c. The number of units inspected; and

d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.

During FY08, Inspectors General and other commissioned officers of the Regular Army conducted 169 inspections of the ARNG, including 711 ARNG units. The bulk of these

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inspections were executed by Regular Army officers assigned to the respective states and territories as Inspectors General. Additionally, other inspections were conducted by First Army, Department of the Army Inspector General, FORSCOM, TRADOC, Army Audit Agency, and National Guard Bureau. Because Inspector General Inspections focus on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of inspections conducted by Inspectors General may be requested for release through the Inspector General of the Army.

The Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command, directed the Inspector General to conduct Special Assessments in FY08 to focus on compliance with the Commanding General's guidance on issues affecting the Army Reserve. During the third and fourth quarters of FY08, the Inspection Team conducted a Special Assessment of the Organizational Inspection Program, which evaluated the program to determine if Commanders were using it to assess readiness and reinforce goals and standards within their commands. The focus of the assessment was to determine if battalion and higher-level units within the Army Reserve understood Army and U.S. Army Reserve Command Organizational Inspection Program guidance and policies, and to determine if those units conducted inspections in accordance with U.S. Army Reserve Command guidance. The U.S. Army Reserve Command Inspector General Inspection Teams assessed the Army Reserve Organizational Inspection Program process at 16 Battalion Headquarters, 6 Group Headquarters, 6 Brigade Headquarters, and 10 Direct Reporting Units.

Another Special Assessment was a Follow-Up Inspection of Soldier Support in Army Reserve Units. The focus of this Follow-Up Assessment was to determine if Army Reserve Units took corrective action on recommendations offered in the 2006 Special Assessment Report of Soldier Support. The Follow-Up Assessment also: examined E6 to E7 promotion procedures for the Troop Program Unit Noncommissioned Officers at the Regional Readiness Command level; assessed compliance with Post Deployment Health Risk Assessment requirements; assessed completion of Line of Duty Investigations within the U.S. Army Reserve Command; and provided an annual regulatory review of compliance with and effectiveness of the Army Voting Assistance Program, a program of special interest to the Department of the Army.

The U.S. Army Reserve Command Inspector General also conducted five Intelligence Oversight Inspections. These regulatory inspections were conducted as part of the U.S. Army Reserve Command's Organizational Inspection Program and provided Intelligence Oversight of intelligence components and activities within the Army Reserve.

In accordance with U.S. Army Reserve Command Regulation 1-201, *Organizational Inspection Program*, the U.S. Army Reserve Command conducts training on the Automated Inspection Program. This automated program is available to all units' and provides checklists and allows users to tailor those checklists to ensure units' processes and programs are inspected to standards. It also provides each higher headquarters the ability to analyze findings and develop trends within their commands. The U.S. Army Reserve Command Inspector General Office conducted training on the Automated Inspection Program at 25 units in FY08.

20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and US Army Reserve Force Support Package units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and US Army Reserve) unit in accordance with Section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State,

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for each such ARNG unit (and for the US Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with Section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or US Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with Section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.

Active Component/ Reserve Component associations no longer exist due to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo.

First U.S. Army and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) for Pacific based Reserve Component units, executes the legislated active duty associate unit responsibilities through pre-mobilization training assistance and postmobilization training and unit validation for conventional Reserve Component units. When Reserve Component units are mobilized they are initially assessed in terms of manpower, equipment, and training by the appropriate chain of command and that assessment is approved by First Army or USARPAC as part of the validation for unit deployment.

Validation of the compatibility of the Reserve Component units with the active duty forces occurs through the mobilization functions with the direct oversight of First Army, USARPAC, and FORSCOM at the Mobilization Stations.

21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to Section 414(c) of the NDAA for FY92 and FY93 (10 U.S.C. 261 note), shown (a) by State for the ARNG (and for the US Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

Title XI (FY08) Authorizations				
	OFF	ENL	WO	TOTAL
U.S. Army Reserve	13	18	0	31
TRADOC	50	12	0	62
FORSCOM	1061	2165	101	3327
USARPAC	30	49	1	80
TOTAL	1154	2244	102	3500

Title XI (FY08) Assigned				
	OFF	ENL	WO	TOTAL
U.S. Army Reserve	32	34	3	69
TRADOC	0	8	0	8
FORSCOM	619	1965	97	2681
USARPAC	23	53	1	77
TOTAL	674	2060	101	2835

In FY06, the Army began reducing authorizations in accordance with the NDAA 2005 (Public Laws 108-767, Section 515). As of September 30, 2008, the Army had 2,835 Active Component Soldiers assigned to Active Component Advisor positions. Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully manage the fill of these positions. The data is captured at the command level. The actual duty location for each position is not captured down to the State level of detail.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MAY 14, 2009

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

Mr. LAMBORN. When the original decision was made to grow the Army to 48 BCTs, the Vice Chief of the Army, Gen Dick Cody, briefed that the stationing decision for the additional 65,000 active duty forces was built on the analysis and studies of all 304 Army posts, camps, and installations. Key considerations in the decision included maximizing support for the growth while balancing future growth potential, power projection, training capacity in maneuver training areas and ranges, and quality of life. Given that the end strength is not changing, what analysis has been done that supports the decision to stop BCT growth at 45 versus 48 BCTs?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) completed a manpower analyses which resulted in the SECDEF's decision to halt the growth of Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) at 45 versus 48, while maintaining the planned increase in Active Component end strength at 547,400. This decision was to ensure the Army has better-manned units ready to deploy, and help put an end to the routine use of Stop Loss. Although the Grow the Army Plan and associated stationing actions remain on track, eight years of sustained combat operations have increased non-deployable rates in our units. This requires the Army to overfill deploying units in order to deploy at a minimum of 90% fill. The additional Soldiers needed to overfill these units reduced available strength for resetting units and the rest of the Army, which impacted the overall readiness of the force. By not building the last three BCTs, ~10,300 Soldiers which would have been used to build the last three BCTs, are now available for the Army to continue to ensure deploying units are appropriately manned, while eventually eliminating stop loss.

Mr. LAMBORN. Since the Army goal appears to be focused on "better-manned" units ready to deploy, will Fort Carson see the expected 4,800 Soldier increase in FY11 previously released by the Army?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The planned FY11 activation of the 5th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson was cancelled following the Secretary of the Army's announcement on June 2, 2009, to halt the Army's plan to grow three additional brigade combat teams. This reduced Fort Carson's planned growth in FY11 by 3,452 Soldiers, and Fort Carson's projected FY11 Soldier population is expected to be 25,101. Using the 2003 Fort Carson population of 15,119 as a baseline for comparison, this demonstrates an increase in Soldier population of 9,982 at Fort Carson by FY11. Installation populations will continue to fluctuate based on operational needs and force structure decisions.

Mr. LAMBORN. Can you provide further documentation and analysis showing the need for additional acreage for training purposes at the Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The current Army position is that there will be no further action on Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site (PMCS) expansion until land owners, willing to sell or lease their land, officially approach the Army. The Army has provided many written reports, analyses, responses to queries, information papers, and briefings to Congress regarding the training needs at the Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site. There are no further documents defining requirements for land at Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site. A partial list of PMCS related documents is provided below.

Army Reports and Studies and Responses Pertaining to Land Acquisition at PCMS:

1. FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 2831 (a) Report on Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site, 18 Jul 08,
2. FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 2829 (a) Report on Utilization and Potential Expansion of Army Operational Ranges, 25 Jul 08,
3. FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 2827 (a) Report on Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site, 30 Nov 06,
4. FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 2827 (c) Report on Potential Expansion of Army Operational Ranges, 1 Feb 07,
5. Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site Land Use Requirements Study (LURS), 17 Mar 05,

6. Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site Analysis of Alternatives Study (AAS), 18 Mar 05,
7. Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site, CO Army Major Land Acquisition Proposal (AMLAP), 18 Jul 06,
8. Fort Carson and Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site Community Research, Jul 08,
9. Information Paper on the Use of Other Federal Lands for Training at PCMS, provided to Rep. Salazar staff, 1 Apr 09,
10. Insert for the Record (Page 68, Line 1505), HASC–Readiness hearing, 24 Feb 2009,
11. Response to Rep. Rob Bishop (R–UT) question regarding other Army land in Utah,
12. Range and Training Land Strategy, 11 Feb 04 (redacted version provided to GAO in Nov 08).

Mr. LAMBORN. As you know, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process “may address many questions.” The report went on to state “nothing in our recommendation prevents the Army from using the NEPA process to provide...the information to Congress in a timely manner.” Do you agree with the GAO? Do you believe that the best way for the Army to provide the remaining answers to Congress on PCMS is to complete an EIS on PCMS expansion?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. Completion of an EIS, as part of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, would potentially provide beneficial insights. However, the current Army position is that there will be no further action on PCMS expansion until land owners, willing to sell or lease their land, approach the Army. If those conditions were met, and a decision made to pursue expansion at PCMS, the Army would complete the appropriate NEPA actions.

Mr. LAMBORN. The Army told Congress in its July 2008 report that if an agreement were forged to expand PCMS, the Army would invest over \$140M in new range facilities to take advantage of the increase training capability. These facilities would employ over 100 people. Can the Army reassure the local citizens of Southeast Colorado that if the Army gets the authority to expand PCMS that you will live up to the commitment to create these jobs and make these investments? One of the key concerns for opponents is the perception that the Army failed to live up to past promises regarding Army investments in the local community surrounding the original creation of PCMS.

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The current Army position is that there will be no further action on Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site expansion until land owners, willing to sell or lease their land, officially approach the Army. As such, there are no plans to invest in \$140M in range facilities nor will there be any need to create additional jobs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

Mr. WITTMAN. The Army’s vehicle modernization plan for the previous six years has focused on the fielding of the FCS family of vehicles. The cornerstone of that plan was the introduction of the Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs) that provide significantly increased capabilities in lethality, survivability, situational awareness, reliability, maintainability and reduced life cycle costs compared to the combat vehicles in the current forces today. We understand that FCS vehicle designs have evolved to incorporate many of the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan and the MGVs provide survivability protection equal to or better than current force vehicles. Further, the MGVs and all other FCS system components have successfully completed a major design review. Given only \$100M has been allocated for these MGVs in FY10, how will the Army take advantage of the technologies and capabilities developed under the FCS program in a new combat vehicle development program while maintaining the momentum and schedule associated with the FCS program?

Secretary GEREN. The Army intends to take advantage of the technologies and capabilities developed under Future Combat Systems (FCS) by making relevant hardware, software, and design work available to potential bidders for the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). Additionally, the Army anticipates that the demonstrated technologies developed under the FCS program will be captured in the new GCV requirements. The relevance of this hardware, software, and design work will be determined by the requirements update as directed by FCS Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), dated 23 June 2009.

In accordance with direction given in the FCS (BCT) ADM issued by the Defense Acquisition Executive, the MGV portions of the FCS program has been terminated

or put on a stop work order. These actions and the reassessment of GCV requirements have fundamentally changed the schedule from that of the original FCS program.

Mr. WITTMAN. After billions of dollars have been invested in FCS MGVs over the past six years, please explain to this committee why the Army cannot leverage this investment, adapt the MGV design to any updated threat requirements, and field these vehicles in the 2015 timeframe as was originally intended?

Secretary GEREN. The FCS MGV designs were adjusted to meet updated threat requirements, most recently in 2007, and again at the end of 2008. Increasing the survivability significantly from the MGV Preliminary Design Review design point to meet the updated threat requirements will require significant redesign of the MGV common chassis, which will delay the MGV fielding timeline.

Mr. WITTMAN. The FCS MGVs were specifically designed for commonality and increased reliability to reduce the operational cost associated with the current force vehicles they are replacing. To date the program is meeting all development goals and milestones. Can the Army afford the increased operational costs of keeping the existing current force vehicles around longer due to the production delays associated with MGVs?

Secretary GEREN. As a result of the generous support from Congress for our Soldiers, the Army has made significant progress over the last several years modernizing and resetting our Combat Vehicles. Therefore we do not foresee a significant increase in operational costs over the near term as a result of keeping the existing current force vehicles longer due to the termination of the FCS program. We believe several years of reset and modernization, readiness profiles, and the overall health of the fleets in question mitigate the risk of significant Operations and Sustainment increases in the short term. For example, the M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles fleets have been undergoing recapitalization efforts since 2001. Recapitalization, coupled with Reset, has resulted in a majority of the M1 Abrams tank and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles being reset or recapitalized since March 2004. This has resulted in an overall extension to the Abrams and Bradley fleet life and mitigates the potential growth in Operations and Sustainment costs. As a result, the average operational readiness rate for these fleets has been above 90 percent since 2008.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK

Mr. LOEBSACK. I am glad to see funding included in the budget request for the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant. The Iowa Ammunition Plant plays a critical role in our national defense, and modernizing the facility is essential to assuring that the men and women who work there do so in a safe and productive environment.

I am also very glad to see that the three Iowa National Guard BRAC sites in my District (in Cedar Rapids, Muscatine, and Middletown) that have been awaiting funding for several years have been included in the budget request for FY 2010. These are critical facilities for the Iowa Guard and their modernization will be essential to readiness and recruiting efforts.

You state in your joint testimony that in 2008, the Army initiated a six month pilot reset program and that you are applying the lessons learned from this program to accomplish reset objectives at home stations. You also state that it is your goal to complete the transformation of the Reserve Components to an operational force by changing the way you train, equip, resource, and mobilize Reserve Component units by 2012.

Can you elaborate on these efforts and specifically address how the Army is assuring that the Reserve Components have the equipment they need to train for, and respond to, the full spectrum of their mission, including homeland defense and emergency response?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The Army's equipping goal is to ensure that Soldiers of both Active and Reserve Components always have the equipment they need to execute their assigned mission as they progress through the cyclic readiness model. That is equipping balance. Balancing growing requirements and fiscal constraints across all areas within a cyclical readiness model to provide trained and ready units to Combatant Commanders is critical.

Since we began to develop modular formations and implement Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), we have developed a strategy to meet the variable equipping needs of a force being managed under cyclic readiness. The Army's strategy is to *Equip to Mission*. As units move through the ARFORGEN cycle, their missions change, as do their equipment requirements. We manage equipment to ensure units have the right types and amounts at the right times.

The Army Equipping Strategy clearly articulates the equipping goals for all units, regardless of component, for each phase of the ARFORGEN and acknowledges the Army National Guard (ARNG) requirement for Critical Dual Use (CDU) equipment. ARFORGEN ensures Reserve Components have the equipment they need to train for and respond to the full spectrum of combat missions. The CDU equipment is not ARFORGEN-dependent and consists of a list of equipment required to support 10 essential capabilities in support of homeland security and homeland defense. The goal is for each unit, in each state, to have on hand this list of equipment and in quantities indicated on its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). Additional equipment not listed on the MTOE is also included. The list of equipment was developed in close coordination with the states and lessons learned from responses to natural disasters such as hurricane relief. Equipping the ARNG with sufficient CDU equipment ensures they have the equipment they need to support homeland security missions and emergency response.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Can you discuss how shifting the Joint Cargo Aircraft solely to the Air Force will affect the National Guard's intra-theater airlift capability and domestic response?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. In and of itself, shifting the JCA solely to the Air Force will not affect the National Guard's intra-theater airlift capability. The Air Force's stated plan is to field all 38 JCAs in the Air National Guard so JCA will remain a National Guard asset. Current procedures allow State Adjutants General to request the assistance of airlift assets from both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. The stationing plan for the Air National Guard JCAs, which will potentially affect response time, will be shaped during final stationing decisions.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Do you believe that the Army National Guard end strength goal of 358,200 will allow for proper dwell time, full training, increased readiness levels, and the end of cross leveling while also reducing the stress on the force?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The Army National Guard (ARNG) end strength of 358,200 does not alleviate the stress on the force, eliminate cross leveling, or increase readiness. Inside the 358,200 end strength are: Soldiers who have not completed their initial entry training, Warriors in Transition, and personnel who are non-deployable due to medical issues. This causes un-readiness in ARNG units forcing commanders to cross-level ~30%-35% of the unit personnel prior to deployment. The elimination of Stop Loss authority further challenges deploying units to mitigate cross leveling.

The Army recognizes the ARNG concerns and the Total Army Analysis (TAA) major objective is to create a Trainees, Transients, Holders, and Students (TTHS) account. However, to increase unit readiness and reduce the need to cross level fully trained Soldiers into the deployment cycle earlier than projected, the ARNG also proposes growing its end strength to create a TTHS account of similar size and scope as the Active Component (AC). The AC places ~13% of its assigned strength in a TTHS account which is not associated with force structure.

If approved, the ARNG will be able to stabilize deploying units earlier in the deployment cycle, increase the dwell Army goal of 1:4 and make future deployments more predictable for the Citizen-Soldiers who are answering the nation's call, reducing the stress in the force.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS

Ms. GIFFORDS. The cancellation of the Mid Range Munition program appears to be premature. It is likely that TRADOC's future recommendation on a new Mounted Combat System will require a stand-off, Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) capability that MRM currently provides. It is also a logical assumption that the current force could benefit from such a capability. Is there a JROC-approved requirement for a BLOS capability for the MCS? Is there Capabilities Decision Document (CDD) currently being staffed that requires BLOS and enhanced lethality in the Abrams? If both requirements remain valid, how does the Army intend to satisfy these BLOS requirements without MRM?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The JROC-approved Future Combat Systems (FCS) Operational Requirements Document includes a requirement for a BLOS capability for the MCS. Additionally, the JROC approved the MRM CDD. The Abrams CDD also includes a BLOS requirement to enhance both lethality and force protection due to greater stand-off against Anti-Tank Guided Munitions threats. The Army is re-evaluating its Brigade Combat Team modernization strategy to include vehicles as well as enabling munitions.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Is the Army predicating the MRM termination based on an assumption that alternative precision indirect fire solutions are available to satisfy a BLOS capability requirement? Can you assure the Committee that the Army is not intending to fill this requirement only with precision indirect fires? Can you comment further on how the CONOPS associated with an MRM-type weapon differs from an indirect fire support mission?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The Army is terminating MRM because funding for its development and acquisition strategy is tied to the termination of Future Combat Systems (FCS). However, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-approved MRM Capabilities Development Document requires MRM be compatible with both FCS and Abrams. The Army is re-evaluating its Brigade Combat Team (BCT) modernization strategy to include vehicles as well as enabling munitions. The concept of operations for MRM type weapons is dependent on BCT enablers and on overall BCT modernization.

MRM is a precision munition fired from a 120mm tank main gun using direct shooter-to-sensor linkage to provide Beyond Line of Sight capability. This characteristic is what makes MRM a direct fire capability instead of indirect fire. Additional information about MRM: (1) With shooter-to-sensor linkage, MRM is a traditional direct fire system that can engage targets "over the hill" or into the next terrain compartment; (2) Because MRM is not guided with a global positioning system (GPS) it can engage moving targets such as vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) or mortars mounted in pick-up trucks as well as heavy armor; (3) MRM is an extension of the direct fire capability of the tank main gun as opposed to indirect fire which transits the battle space. MRM is fired in a company size area of operation; (4) MRM does not have the latency of indirect fire because it is fired from a high density platform in the formation. It requires less time to travel because tanks are generally in the vicinity of the action. For example a battery will fire targets sequentially while a company of Abrams could fire multiple targets simultaneously; (5) MRM cannot be fired using an extreme high angle like indirect fire systems.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Given the success of the Abrams tank in Iraq in both conventional and irregular warfare and testing that indicates that MRM would also be effective against armor, bunkers, structures, troops and thin skinned vehicles, isn't it prudent to maintain funding for the MRM program? Would the MRM program help the Army maintain a capabilities balance within modernization for full spectrum operations?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. We continue to assess the lethality requirements of our ground combat formations carefully to ensure these formations are equipped properly for Irregular/Hybrid Warfare combat operations while also ensuring our Army maintains a campaign and expeditionary quality force with full spectrum capabilities. While we recognize the tremendous capability Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) munitions like Mid-Range Munition (MRM) can potentially provide our Soldiers and formations, we are in the process of refining our Brigade Combat Team (BCT) modernization strategy and force structure plans to ensure our Army is equipped properly for the wide range of warfighting capabilities required for these types of operations and missions. Additionally, the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will further illuminate Army warfighting requirements and the associated modernization requirements. Whatever approach we take regarding BLOS munitions, it will be integrated with and supporting of our BCT modernization strategy and force structure plan, as well as meeting QDR-directed capabilities. In doing so, we will ensure our Soldiers and formations continue to have lethality overmatch during this ongoing period of persistent conflict.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Did the Army evaluate the possibility of sustaining the MRM program at a minimum rate through FY10 in the likely event that any new ground vehicle would also have the requirement for BLOS capability?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. No. With the termination of Future Combat Systems Manned Ground Vehicles, there is no current, validated requirement for MRM in FY10. Should a future Ground Combat Vehicle requirement include a BLOS capability, all options would be evaluated to meet that need.

Ms. GIFFORDS. What is the minimum budget required to sustain the MRM program through FY10?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. Since the FCS Manned Ground Vehicle program was terminated and the funding eliminated, there is no justification for sustaining MRM in FY10. Accordingly, no budget projections have been prepared for the program.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Has the Army evaluated the termination costs associated with the proposed cancellation of the Mid Range Munition program in the FY10 request?

What would those costs be and do they exceed the costs associated with maintaining a minimum rate of production through FY10?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. All termination costs will be borne from current FY09 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds. Termination cost is estimated to be about \$1.4 million. There is no cost of maintaining a minimum rate of production since MRM would have still been in Engineering and Manufacturing Development in FY10.

Ms. GIFFORDS. What would be the restart costs associated with MRM if the program were to be reconstituted in FY11?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The cost to reconstitute and restart MRM beginning in FY11 would be about \$75 million more over the previous Engineering and Manufacturing Development total program cost.

Ms. GIFFORDS. If MRM were cancelled this year and the requirement revalidated under a new ground system program, would the Army also be required to pay the costs of recompeting this capability, adding to the overall cost?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. Yes.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Would a decision to defer termination of MRM until the MGCV program is realigned be less costly than termination in FY10?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The Army made the decision to terminate MRM in July 2009 and there are no program funds in FY10. The MRM program will terminate within its remaining FY09 program funding. However, it is expected that the cost for restarting and completing the MRM program would increase.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. NYE

Mr. NYE. I would like to commend the Army for its hard work and initiative developing the Third Generation Extended Cold Weather Clothing System (GEN III ECWCS). I strongly believe the system fills an essential role in ensuring the safety and health of our soldiers while bolstering mission readiness and combat capability. I understand GEN III ECWCS has proven to be a combat advantage for our troops. Compared to the previous clothing system, GEN III reduces the weight borne by the soldier by 7 lbs and reduces bulk volume by 33%. However, I remain concerned about the Army's present and future plans to fully field and fund the GEN III ECWCS System.

What is the Army's requirement for GEN III ECWCS and how does the Army plan to fund the deployment of GEN III in future years in the absence of supplemental funds?

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The Army requirement to provide its Soldiers effective protection from the environment without hindering their performance is documented in our Core Soldier System Capability Production Document (CPD). The Third Generation Extended Cold Weather Clothing System (GEN III ECWCS) supports this requirement as a product improvement over previously fielded Soldier items. At this time, one set of GEN III ECWCS is fielded per deploying Soldier as part of our Rapid Fielding Initiative. The Army's future requirement for GEN III ECWCS is currently being staffed as part of an update to the Core Soldier System CPD, and will likely be one set per Soldier.

Current GEN III ECWCS fielding is supported primarily with supplemental funding; however, there is limited sustainment funding for select layers as part of Army Clothing Bag and Central Issue Facility support. For future years the Army Staff is in the process of developing fielding and sustainment processes that will be integrated into the Equipping and Sustainment Program Objective Memorandum requests for Fiscal Years 2012 and beyond.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BOREN

Mr. BOREN. Please describe the Operational Needs Statement (ONS) and the tactical situation in Afghanistan that necessitates a precision mortar solution?

Secretary GEREN. The requirement for precision capability within a 120mm mortar system answers a capability gap for highly accurate precision fire when other means of precision fire are not readily available. Other platforms with precision capability include M109 and M777 Howitzers with Excalibur, Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) with Guided-MLRS, in addition to Army and Air Force aviation assets. Precision guided munitions will provide an organic capability to all units assigned with 120mm Mortars. More extensive fielding of this capability provides for greater precision area coverage within the Theater of Operations. The smaller warhead and corresponding blast radius of a 120mm precision round gives the Warfighter more targeting flexibility through the advantage of less potential collateral damage.

eral damage. Additionally, the 120mm Mortar's relatively small size to other platforms enables greater battlefield mobility.

Mr. BOREN. I am concerned to learn that the APMI schedule has slipped several weeks. Is urgency the priority in fielding this capability and if so, when does the Army intend to deliver the first production round to Soldiers in Afghanistan?

Secretary GEREN. The Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative (APMI) demonstration, completed during the April-May 2009 timeframe at Yuma Proving Grounds, was delayed by two weeks. However, this delay did not in turn delay the projected fielding of initial APMI rounds to OEF. The objective of the APMI fielding schedule remains to deliver the first APMI rounds to our Soldiers in Afghanistan within 11 months of receipt of funding from the Army's Fiscal Year 2009 (FY09) Omnibus reprogramming request. The Army is evaluating alternative resourcing solutions to ensure we meet the Warfighter's urgent operational need for to APMI as quickly as possible within receipt of Omnibus funds.

Mr. BOREN. How does the Army intend to fund this initiative?

Secretary GEREN. The Army requested FY09 funding as part of the Omnibus Reprogramming. Additional requirements for RDTE and Procurement funds in FY10 will require reprogramming actions. Funding requirements for FY11 and beyond will be addressed in annual budget requests.

Mr. BOREN. Please describe for the record the performance associated with the APMI demonstrations now underway at Yuma. Please include a description of each test shot, to include range, temperature conditioning, elevation change and whether meteorological data was utilized in computing a fire solution. Include threshold and objective requirements for the munition and indicate whether the performance of each test shot satisfied these requirements.

Secretary GEREN. The Army completed the APMI demonstrations in May 2009. Three of the four competing contractors had designs mature enough to proceed into the next phase. Since the Army has not selected the final design, the test results from the APMI demonstration are considered competition sensitive and cannot be publically released at this time. The threshold accuracy is 10 meters Circular Error Probable (CEP); objective accuracy is five meters CEP. CEP is a statistical distribution where 50 percent of the rounds land within the radius of a circle and 50 percent outside.

Mr. BOREN. The APMI acquisition strategy proposes a three-month Phase I technology demonstration contract between two contractors following completion of the Yuma testing in May. Typically, tech demos are at least one year efforts that allow contractors to significantly refine and rework designs, addressing issues raised during the initial test phase. In this case, it appears that the truncated Phase I tech demo will allow very little opportunity to modify the design, consuming dollars and time that could be used to more rapidly field rounds to theater. In the event a technically superior round is demonstrated in May, will the Army forgo Phase I and proceed directly to Phase II to accelerate availability of this needed munition?

Secretary GEREN. The Army has established an aggressive program schedule in order to respond to the approved Operational Needs Statement (ONS) as rapidly as possible. Based on the results of the May 2009 demonstration, the Army intends, subject to availability of funding, to award three follow-on contracts for Phase I. The short timeframe for Phase I is possible based on the maturity of the demonstrated designs coming out of the demonstration. The down-select decision to go from Phase I to a single design in Phase II & production will be based on an established set of criteria that includes the key program elements of technical, cost, and schedule to deliver sufficient quantity to meet the ONS requirement.

Mr. BOREN. Background: Excalibur is a GPS-guided 155mm artillery round and can be fired from the M109A6 Paladin and the M777 Lightweight Howitzer as well as from the Non-Line of Sight Cannon. The first increment of Excalibur, XM982 1A1, was fielded to Iraq in May 2007 in response to an Urgent Needs Statement for precision cannon munitions in Iraq. The Objective accuracy requirement for Excalibur 1A1 is 10 meters Circular Error Probable and performance in the field has far exceeded this requirement. Procurement of the second increment of Excalibur, 1A2, will begin in FY09 and a competition is underway for the third increment, intended to offer objective accuracy of 6 meters CEP with a lower unit cost.

Does the Army intend to review Excalibur compatibility and support for meeting the existing objective range requirements of the NLOS-Cannon as part of the TRADOC FCS realignment?

Secretary GEREN. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command is currently reviewing capability gaps of the current force to guide development of requirements for a future Ground Combat Vehicle as part of FCS realignment. The Excalibur 1b Operational Requirements Document objective range requirement is 40km and the review indicates the objective range requirement remains valid.

The Army intends to remain committed to our requirement for the full compatibility of Excalibur as a key enabler (as outlined in our requirements documents) for the M777 Lightweight Howitzer, M109A6 Paladin, Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) Howitzer and any future indirect fire cannon.

Mr. BOREN. As the Army moves increasingly to precision fire solutions, are the logistics and support function savings being weighted in evaluating unit costs? The requirement for certain Excalibur missions calls for defeating a target with two rounds; unguided artillery would traditionally require some 150 rounds to achieve the same effect, with likely significant collateral damage. Aside from the direct reduction in the number of rounds fired, fewer artillery tubes may be required for the same effects, fewer trucks may be required to move pallets of ammo, and fewer gallons of fuel are consumed. How is the Army accounting for the internal savings associated with precision fires?

Secretary GEREN. Costs are considered when the Army evaluates all of the potential solutions available to meet our validated requirements, including changes in doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and material solutions. If the Army determines that a material solution is required to meet the requirement, complete lifecycle costs estimates are prepared and reviewed at each milestone decision review. These lifecycle estimates include costs associated with the logistics and support functions required to support that material solution. In that regard, logistics and support costs are considered and weighed in the evaluation of unit costs.

Mr. BOREN. A recent open letter from former artillery commanders bemoaned a lack of training and the atrophying of experience in artillery units. Are tactics, training and procedures being updated to address the new flexibility that precision fires offer? Are Excalibur rounds being used regularly at the National Training Center as part of unit workups prior to deployment?

Secretary GEREN. Yes, tactics, techniques, and procedures are continually updated to address the unique capabilities that precision guided munitions offer at both the Fires Center of Excellence and tactical field artillery units. Precision guided munitions mission considerations and target effects have been integrated in all relevant courses to date.

Excalibur munitions are used or replicated routinely at the Maneuver Combat Training Centers (MCTCs) to prepare units and Soldiers for deployment. Incorporating live fire of Excalibur at the MCTCs enables both the gunnery team and maneuver commander to execute precision munitions mission and see the effects on the ground.

